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ABSTRACT 
  
Kashif Jerome Powell: Specters and Spooks: Developing a Hauntology of The Black Body  
(Under the direction of Dr. Renee Alexander-Craft) 
 
This dissertation utilizes theories of embodiment and performance to develop a 
“hauntology of blackness,” which investigates imaginative sites of death constructed through the 
historical, social, and performative facets of institutional slavery in the United States to theorize 
notions of blackness and the black body. I argue that the relationship between the black body and 
death have conjured a death-driven specter that manifest historically, performatively, visually, 
and phenomenally as blackness. The rise and continual return of this “specter of blackness” 
positions the black body in the United States as a body “haunted” by its own biological and 
phenotypical disposition. Placing the theory of Jacques Derrida and Frantz Fanon in conversation 
with scholars such as Avery Gordon, Saidiya Hartman, Toni Morrison, and others, I evoke the 
language of haunting to consider the profound effect the relationship between the black body and 
death has had on ontological, psychoanalytic, and phenomenological understandings of 
blackness within post-modernity.
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PROLOGUE:  
The end is in the beginning and lies far ahead.  
 
Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man1  
 
The prologue of Ralph Ellison’s classic novel descends deep into the catacombs beneath 
1950s Manhattan, into the decrepit, not quite forgotten architectural remains upon which the city 
is built. We begin here: in the assumed darkness of the city beneath the City, in the hole-become-
home that Ellison’s fallen protagonist inhabits at the end of his journey through a world 
unconscious of his presence. In the settled dust of New York’s sub-terrains, Ellison’s anti-hero 
begins the Homeric recital of his journey. Through each episode of the novel, from witnessing 
his grandfather’s final words,2 to his the misadventure of the Golden Day Saloon, and his 
affiliations with the Brotherhood and Ras the Destroyer, Ellison’s protagonist is enlivened, 
charged, by the kinesthetic force immanent within the body. Through a delicate scripting of that 
force, Ellison’s narrates the experience of blackness as a tumultuous romance; an intimate and 
ongoing relationship in which a body marked by blackness circles around the vortex of 
nonexistence/non-presence, a recursive motion that dramatizes the ludic possibilities between 
presence and absence—a dance that places into crisis the underpinnings of Western metaphysics, 
the fetishization of pure presence and its opposite: pure absence. Through the politics and the 
poetics of invisibility, Ellison upturns metaphysics to expose myths of ontological realness, 
finding that which resonates between absence and presence and tracing that remainder upon the 
flesh. The body of Ellison’s Invisible Man carries more than the visual signification of 
blackness—the materiality of pigmented flesh—rather his protagonist carries the weight of
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blackness, a quality of Being that slips between the metaphysical dichotomies of presence and 
absence to call into question the structure of ontology and the arbitration of existence. 
Articulating blackness as that which is traced through both existence and nonexistence, Ellison 
renegotiates the relationship between time, space, and body to locate divergent possibilities of 
black life within the outer realms of visuality and aurality. He articulates blackness as an 
uncanny state of Being, one that dances on the edge of visibly and presence, riffing on the 
structure of ontology through harmonized yet extemporaneous expression and agency.  
Specters and Spooks: Developing a Hauntology of the Black Body is conceived within the 
force of Ellison’s riff. Charged by the kinetic tension that surges between the seemingly 
dialectical poles of presence and absence, this project investigates the ontology of blackness by 
dissecting the unyielding relationship between the black body and the history of death that I 
argue constitutes black existence. I engage critical race theory, phenomenology, and performance 
theory to address the deeply resonant affective ecologies constructed within historical, social, 
and performative facets of institutional slavery in the United States; ecologies that 
simultaneously consume and enliven figures of blackness with equal and opposite intensities of 
life and death, phenomenality and spectrality, beginnings and endings. Juxtaposing the vitality of 
existence—life, presence, beginnings, that which manifest through the performed resistance of 
the body3— to the sociohistorical and socioaesthetic negation/absence/death phenomenally 
experienced by black bodies, I hope to understand how blackness materializes, through visuality 
and performance, as the coalesced trace of existence and nonexistence in a singular form.  
As such, blackness can be described in terms of ontology; the conceptual presence of 
blackness is materially and corporeally representable, and, through such manifestations and 
bodily possessions, is placed in intimate relation to the world. The presence of blackness, 
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however, its representation and relation to the world, is characterized by the dense absence of 
subjectivity lost in the midst of chattel slavery. This absence is continually made present through 
thousands of stories that work to reify the borders of the black body. Blackness, then, is 
ontological positioned as an incessant and immutable return to abject conditions of loss and 
absence. It is incomprehensible, perhaps even nonexistent, beyond its own phenomenon. As 
such, blackness cannot be described by ontology alone.  
The chapters of Specters and Spooks, therefore, work in concert to develop, what I call, a 
“hauntology of blackness,” which follows the trace of blackness beyond limiting ontological 
conceptions, into the depths just beneath the surface of black facticity. Using hauntology as a 
theoretical guide, I invest in the metaphysics of both presence and absence to articulate blackness 
as the ever-evolving relationship between the flesh-and-blood body and slavery’s ecologies of 
death, which, once manifested through multiple bodies separated by space and time, is visually, 
performatively, and psychically condensed within a single, seemingly autonomous signifier: 
blackness. In investigating the phenomenal configurations of blackness, the ways by which the 
presence of a body makes manifest the affective ecologies of death, I turn to critical studies in 
performance, and its theoretical appetite for understanding and articulating the cyclical 
performativities that fashion the relationship between a body and the world. Critical performance 
theory questions not only the performative consequences of a body’s relationality to the world, 
but delves deeper to question the essential, perhaps ontological, constitutive elements of the 
relationship itself. And so, this project is concerned not only with the phenomenal manifestations 
of blackness, i.e. the techniques by which blackness is articulated onto bodies and subsequently 
performed in relation to the world, but it is concurrently invested in outlining the fundamental 
conditions of possibility that haunt those performativities.  
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I first became aware of the layered meaning that seemed to haunt my body as an 
undergraduate at Morehouse College, when six young men from Jena, Louisiana, similar in age 
and complexion, were arrested and unjustly charged with first-degree murder after assaulting a 
fellow student who referred to them as niggers. I felt immediately connected to those young men, 
having experienced the ease with which the utterance of that word, out of the wrong mouth, 
incites an unbridled rage within the most even-tempered individual. But as I continued to watch, 
that connection moved beyond empathy. The saga of these six young men encouraged me to 
unravel my own identity, and in doing so I found similarities in the underlying patterns between 
the Jena Six and my self that went beyond our individual personhood. Our mirrored orientations 
as black and male marked our bodies as products of the same genealogical arc, uniting our 
separate experiences through deep associations between our bodies and affective ecologies of 
death.4 Emerging from my experience of the Jena Six, Specters and Spooks unpacks the black 
body as the haunted confluence of life and death in a singular form by traversing the liminity 
between the matter of blackness, that is to say, the factic materiality of a black body, and the 
often-absented spatial and temporal conditions under which blackness as an exercise of power 
emerges.  
The chapters of Specters and Spooks uncoil, in the light of inspirations such as Della 
Pollock, Renee Alexander-Craft, and the linage of theorists whose writings perform their 
polemic, as an investment in the written word that performatively (de)constructs my experience 
of, what I identify as, the deep personal and political hauntings of blackness.5  The text follows a 
poetic logic; I employ metaphor and tightly compacted imagery and language to emulate, what I 
call, the specter of blackness, a brooding figure that lies buried beneath the surface, and through 
quiet irruption, seizes possession of the word/flesh to layer it with a meaning that exceeds its 
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own facticity. This engagement with the performative body, both as written text and as flesh, 
seeks to dissect the emergent conditions of blackness within slavery’s ecologies of death to 
expose the embryonic possibilities of the haunted state of blackness. This possibility of 
phenomenal reconstitution is woven throughout the text of Specters and Spooks; it is the 
backward-reaching end that structures the beginning, the impulse that voices the body’s ludic 
potentialities—the cadence of Ellison’s song, and the key to which Specters and Spooks is 
written.
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CHAPTER 1: THE H(A)UNTING OF BLACKNESS, AN AMERICAN TRADITION 
Death cut the strings that gave me life,  
And handed me to Sorrow, 
The only kind of middle wife 
My folks could beg or borrow.  
 
Countee Cullen, Saturday’s Child6  
 
Introduction and Primary Argument  
A specter is haunting America—the specter of blackness:7 Realized through the shared 
tragedy of chattel slavery, and carrying the burden of that institution’s socio-political, 
socioaesthetic, and imaginative resonance, the ecologies of life and death inherent to this 
opening statement structures the premise of Specters and Spooks. But this is not a story of death, 
but rather of the overwhelming force of life forged through white-hot cinders of nonexistence. It 
is a story of the children of Saturday, subjectivities birthed through tropes of darkness and 
abjection; a story buried in the flesh of bodies consumed by the aftermath of that conception—a 
ghost story. Investing in haunting not simply as a return of those long dead, the story details the 
maturation of affective forces made present through the muted intensity of bodies carrying the 
dead’s spectral weight. 
Articulating the continuation of the ontological associations between figures of blackness 
and death, I argue that blackness operates as the spectral form of the (almost) unknowable and 
(nearly) intangible force of violence and death that was enacted against black, enslaved bodies 
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within what anthropologist Michael Taussig refers to as, “space of death;” a space in which 
human subjectivity is formed through a culture of terror and torture—a violence that lingers and 
will not go away. 8 Outlining its multifaceted tradition, Taussig explains, “The space of death is 
crucial to the creation of meaning and consciousness … these spaces of death blend as a common 
pool of key signifiers or caption points binding the culture of the conqueror with that of the 
conquered. The space of death is pre-eminently a space of transformation: through the 
experience of death, life; through fear, loss of self and conformity to a new reality…”9 Creating a 
phenotypical exception that existed both within and beyond the category of human—the black 
body—slavery necessarily shifted the ontological terrain of humanity. The epistemological and 
ontological configurations of the institution of slavery transformed blackness from a 
phenotypical signifier to an inescapable marker of death; blackness signified a body politically 
and socially devoid of lineage, and lacking the ontological capacity for life.  
Frantz Fanon details this ontologization through the analogy of collapse, a giving away of 
the body schema to a historized racial epidermal schema. But I use the word specter as derived 
from its Derridian roots, as “the tangible intangibility of a proper body without flesh, but still the 
body of someone as someone other.”10 Recognized through its fleeting presence, blackness 
flashes up and then recedes at the moment just before its full recognition, leaving a material yet 
unspeakable trace of death not only within the space and time between bodies, but within bodies 
themselves. It is this re/markable presence of material and historical death/absence that, I argue, 
persists in the film and fiber of post-modernity, haunting bodies placed in relation to its specter 
as it leaves a corporeal and subliminal trace. The goal of this project is to demonstrate how 
bodies are simultaneously inhabited by and exceed the visual, aural, and phenomenal 
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materializations of death. Within this ontological quarry, these bodies are forced to live without 
full knowledge of what it is they are haunted by, the specters of blackness. 
Theory and Methods  
Specters and Spooks probes historical narratives of death and dismay, visual discourses 
of the black body, and theories of haunting and performance to deconstruct the regimes of race 
that frame contemporary understandings of the deathly presence we have come to know as 
blackness. It mobilizes the phenomenological methods of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Judith 
Butler, the psychoanalytic inquires of Fanon and Julia Kristeva, and contemporary critical race 
theory forwarded by Afro-Pessimists and Afro-Optimist, namely Saidiya Hartman and Fred 
Moten. I place these thinkers in conversation to theorize the interstitial space between bodies 
steeped in histories of chattel slavery, not only as connective tissue, but as flesh epidermalized 
into blackness and animated by death: blackness. The lingering affect of this process of 
epidemralization, I argue, continues to haunt not only the imaginaries of post-modernity, but also 
the bodies phenomenally and pathologically constituted within the material contours of those 
imaginaries. This project juxtaposes ontological, phenomenological, and psychoanalytic 
questions of embodiment with the aim of, in the lineage of Saidiya Hartman, articulating how the 
haunting presence of chattel slavery continues to frame the contours of our bodies, both in life 
and in death.  
For me, the recognition of this haunting was most felt in the wake of the 2006 Jena Six 
incident. However, it outlines the realities of the 1991 police beating of Rodney King; the 
dragging death of James Byrd on June 7, 1998 in Jasper, Texas; Amadou Bailo Diallo, the 23-
year-old Guinean man shot to death by New York police on February 4, 1999; the 23-year-old 
Oscar Grant III who was fatally shot in the back by Oakland police at 2:15am on New Year’s 
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Day in 2009; Millton Hall, the 49-year-old mentally disabled panhandler shot 46 times by police 
in Saginaw, Michigan on July 1, 2012; Chavis Carter, the 21-year-old black male in Jonesboro, 
Arkansas who was found dead on July 29, 2012 from a fatal gunshot to the head while 
handcuffed in the back of a police cruiser. Perhaps the most public call of the specter was voiced 
through the body of Trayvon Martin, the 17-year-old victim of Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” 
law, killed by George Zimmerman, a self-appointed neighborhood watch coordinator. Martin’s 
death and the subsequent “not-guilty” verdict rendered to Zimmerman undoubtedly conjures 
memories of the 14 year-old Emmett Till and his acquitted executioners, Roy Bryant and his 
half-brother John William Milam.  
Inexhaustible in number, the deaths of these figures have afterlives through living bodies 
through a process Joseph Roach calls surrogation. The need to fill the unoccupiable space left 
open by the loss of Martin, Till, and others is continually encoded and decoded through a range 
of representational performative practices. In this way, these figures assume a life-in-death. As 
Roach explains, the “…histories of private life, histories of death, or histories of memory itself—
attend especially to those performative practices that maintain (and invent) human continuities, 
leaving their traces in diversified media, including the living bodies of the successive generations 
that sustain different social and cultural identities.”11 The absence of Martin and Till, as well as 
the multitude of black bodies subjected to dense ecologies of nonexistence and death, not only 
manifest into outward performative expressions, but are (almost) imperceptibly sedimented into 
the bodies of those continuing to live within the conscious or unconscious memory of the 
unfillable absence that constitutes their presence.  
Attempting to understand this confluence of the corporeal and spectral, I catalyze 
phenomenology both as a method and as a heuristic analytic of the lived body. I specifically turn 
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to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, which engages phenomenology not only as a 
methodology, but as the ontological grounding of human reality that is pronounced through an 
intimate “belonging-together,” the inescapable co-presence of human subjectivity that orients 
knowledge production and consciousness. 12 Things and others of the world are marked in 
relation to the lived body, with the space and time between them remaining held-open for 
(re)imagination, (re)signification, and (re)articulation. According to Merleau-Ponty, a crucial 
component to the lived experience of the body, as well as phenomenology as a whole, is 
intentionality, or what has been termed meaning-direction. He explains that the things and others 
that we encounter are imbued with spatial and temporal lines of flight that direct my experience 
of them. However, the meaning-directions of objects and others are highly ambiguous, not in the 
sense of vague or indifferent, but rather meaning-directions are open to a multiplicity of 
possibilities. Consequently, the lived body is grounded in this same sense of perceptual 
ambiguity. Merleau-Ponty defines the body as the fabric interwoven throughout all things. The 
body therefore develops an intentional arc, a particular display of the fabric’s pattern as woven 
by our everyday existence. In short, the intentionality of one’s body becomes the crux of 
consciousness and embodiment.  
Not only does the intentional arc thrust the body toward an imaginative ambiguity, it also 
imbues the body with affective charges. In 1982 Julia Kristeva, in Powers of Horror: an Essay 
on Abjection, highlights the relationship between affect and the body by forwarding the notion of 
abjection as seminal to the configuration of the psychoanalytic self. She posits that the subject is 
characterized by intense, affective relationships to the objects that it encounters; it is, in fact, 
through this object-subject relation that the self is formed. If the body is the fabric woven 
through all things, then affect is the thread. In this way, the self/consciousness is oriented by the 
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body, which operates within an affective and ambiguous intentionality that allows the world to 
constantly appear through multiple and varied expressive possibilities.  
Understanding the pathology of the self as constituted through the orientation of the body 
brings to the forefront of this project a multitude of questions that bare great significance: If a 
body is spatially directed by a shared inhabitance of the world with things and others, what are 
the implications of this process of orientation for a body phenomenally perceived through the 
visual and aural registers of blackness? More specifically, how does the epistemological and 
ontological location of blackness outside the purview of “the human” influence the events of 
consciousness-raising for bodies phenomenally marked as black? What “consciousness” is 
“produced” in response to the affective charges of a body’s phenomenological orientation within 
Taussig’s space of death? And how are these events of consciousness-raising reproduced within 
multiple bodies through both the accumulation, as well as the diachronic and synchronic 
transferal of those affective charges?  
I employ phenomenological theory and methods to address these questions by 
understanding how the lived body dwells in space, and is in constant negotiation of how it relates 
to the contours of the space it inhabits. Phenomenology suggests that the body operates within a 
regime of reciprocity; if objects reach the body through perpetual experience, then the body 
reaches back to them by “tending toward” these same objects. As explained by Sarah Ahmed, 
“[our bodies] move toward and away from objects depending on how we are moved by them.”13  
The affect objects carry direct our bodies to a space that is familiar and allows our body to 
become orientated. Space necessitates that the body is orientated by these affective and 
perceptual lines of meaning that serve as the link between the object and the self—the thread to 
our bodily fabric—thus making the space we inhabit sensational and affective.  
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Space is a matter of how objects impress on the body by the presence of what is 
perceived, as well as the absence of what is “behind” the object, or what was necessary for the 
object’s arrival, but remains unseen or unfelt. Through this relational constitution, the object 
makes the self and the self makes the object; we are hailed into subjectivity by the lines of 
meaning available to the experience of our body. The intimacy between the body and its 
dwelling place positions space not simply as a container for the body, but as a functional 
operation of the body itself. As bodies move through space, that movement shapes not only the 
intentional arc of the body, but the space itself. Bodies are the spaces they take up; they are the 
directions they face, the lines of meaning they follow, the objects they tend toward, and the 
affect they carry.14 
The lived body, however, is not only spatially oriented, but configured through temporal 
orientations as well. Phenomenology expounds upon the ways our bodies are shaped by the 
histories of objects, and how those histories are performed on and through the body. Ahmed 
refers to such an investigation as an “ethnography of things,” where one considers how an object 
is brought forth through particular conditions of emergence, and how the body responds to that 
historically-oriented appearance.15 Arguing against Heidegger’s notion of thrownness, Ahmed 
urges that objects do not simply appear in the world, but matriculate through time. Offering a 
précis of the temporal considerations of the phenomenological method Ahmed explains, “The 
object could even be described as a transformation of time into form…”16 carrying with it the 
history of its conditioning. The question the “ethnographer” must ask is then “what historical 
work goes into the making of an object?” To answer this question, the “ethnographer” must turn 
to Marx and Engels who argue that an individual, “…[must] see how the sensuous world around 
him [sic] is, not a thing given direct for all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of 
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industry, and of the state of society…the result of the activity of a whole succession of 
generations, each standing on the shoulders of the proceeding one.”17  
Taking the Marxist approach to phenomenology further, Ahmed turns to Marx’s model of 
commodity fetishism to explain how the body’s sensuous experience of an object is also 
grounded in that object’s history of labor. As Marx explains, a commodity (what we have termed 
an “object”) is comprised of two things: matter and labor, where the commodity is brought forth 
through the labor of converting matter to form. The labor of changing matter to form imbues the 
object with a level of use value, as well as exchange value. A body directed toward a particular 
object extends into the space it inhabits, more or less, depending on the use value of that 
particular object. The body’s relationship to space, as well as ways in which the body can be 
extended through the temporally-constructed value of an object, demonstrates how bodies that 
are orientated toward objects of greater value are granted agency to extend further into the space 
it inhabits.18 A phenomenological approach to subjectivity apprehends how objects are shaped by 
the temporality of what precedes it, and how bodies extend into space by extracting the history of 
value contained within the body’s intended/perceived object; a history that is often lost in the 
“hereness” of the object’s spatial orientation. As Ahmed, by way of Marx, suggests, an object is 
the transformation of time into form, therefore phenomenology accounts for the emergent 
conditions of a body through its reciprocal relation to objects.  
This relationship produces a bodily knowledge that is often revealed through habit, the 
performance of a remembered history that emerges in the “hereness” of the body. The habitual, 
however, is not simply understood as the repetition of tending toward an object. Rather habits 
“involve the incorporation of that which is ‘tended toward’ into the body. These objects” Ahmed 
continues, “extend the body by extending what it can reach. Reachability is hence an effect of the 
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habitual, in the sense that what is reachable depends on what bodies ‘take in’ as objects that 
extend their bodily motility, becoming like second skin.”19 This “second skin” is the body’s 
consumption, and subsequent performance of the historical knowledge(s) of the object. This 
consumption allows for a body to articulate the self through those same historical knowledge(s). 
In turn, the body becomes a site of living memory, a performative manifestation of uniquely 
oriented living archive of the objects it incorporates. Investigating the performative confluence 
of memory, history, and the phenomenal body, Roach elucidates how “performances so often 
carry within them the memory of otherwise forgotten substitutions—those that were rejected 
and, even more invisibly, those that have succeeded.”20 The lived body “lives” in the forgotten 
memory of history, in the substitutions that have become invisibly sedimented in the body; the 
curves of our feet, the etched lines in our hands, the hue of our shoulders all carry significant 
historical presence that is performed at every turn.  
With this theoretical foundation, Specters and Spooks investigates the lived body as it is 
expressed through the phenomenal experience we have come to understand as blackness. As 
such, this project is firmly rooted in, what Roach has identified as, a “genealogy of 
performance,” which “document—and suspect—the historical transmission and dissemination of 
cultural practices through collective representations” that are amassed and sedimented in the 
body.21 This project excavates the history that, I argue, has been lost in the “hereness” of the 
lived black body, an object manufactured through the process of transforming of time into form. 
Providing a detailed definitional offering, Roach explains, 
Genealogies of performance attend not only to “the body,” as 
Foucault suggests, but also to bodies—to the reciprocal reflections 
they make on one another’s surfaces as they foreground their 
capacities for interaction. Genealogies of performance also attend 
to “counter-memories,” or the disparities between history as it is 
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discursively transmitted and memory as it is publicly enacted by 
the bodies that bear its consequences.”22 
 
Bodies “blackened” through the transformational process of commodity fetishism most certainly 
bear the consequences of the disparities between sociopolitical and socioaesthetic articulations of 
black performance and the histories in which those bodies are steeped. 
This genealogy of performance takes the presence of the black body as a specter that is 
lost in the hereness of the lived body, and attempts to uncover the specter’s conditions of 
emergence, investigate the means by which the spectral affect is sedimented unto particular 
bodies and continues to persist in the contemporary moment. In locating this specter, I ask: how 
have the Tran-Atlantic histories of the American Slave Trade, particularly in the United States, 
constructed the notion of blackness through a culture of genealogical, social, and physical death? 
Further how did the cultural associations between blackness and death come to “haunt” bodies of 
black facticity and establish, what I call, a performative hauntology of death? Finally I question 
how performative counter-investments in the lived body can be enacted within the historical 
fixity of the black body that disrupts and reconfigures the phenomenal existence of blackness?  
Addressing these questions necessitates a return to Ahmed’s discussion of skin second. 
As established earlier, the body’s second skin—the relational bodily performance of historical 
knowledge—is grounded in the habitual. Ahmed, advancing Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological 
methods, by theorizing the interstitial space between a body and its relational object to 
demonstrate how the repetition of tending toward an object forms habits that allow particular 
bodies to extend into particular spaces. Merleau-Ponty articulates “those actions in which I 
habitually engage incorporate their instruments into themselves and make them play a part in the 
original structure of my own body”(emphasis mine).23 Merleau-Ponty’s reasoning of the habitual 
body as not simply a body that repeats action, but is an active body inextricably bound to/in the 
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world and establishing the ontological constitution of the body. If habit, however, surfaces 
through our relationship to objects, what habits emerge through a relationship with one’s own 
bodies as object? Further, what ontology is constituted through such a relation?   
These questions churn at the center of Judith Butler’s project of performativity, 
articulating how bodies become objects of historical discourses and are habituated to perform the 
historical possibilities therein. Bodies, as social agents, are not the producers/subjects of a social 
reality constituted through language, gesture, and symbol, but are rather produced by—the 
objects of—language, gesture, and symbol. Butler stresses that the body is the composite of 
stylized repetitive acts: habits, gestures, movements, speech and other myriad forms of embodied 
possibilities that are cobbled together to represent an idealized unity—the body, an “object of 
belief,” where the various acts of the body work to create the idea of the body, and without such 
acts the idea of the body vanishes.24 And as we perform our historically situated bodies, we are 
compelled to believe the performance and therefore perpetuate this mode of belief.  
Deeply rooted in a temporal orientation, acts of the body are not self-generative. Rather 
the body is historically dramatic, it is a performative and dynamic materialization of time into the 
multiple possibilities of form. Therefore, bodies are not “merely factic materiality, one is not 
simply a body, but…one does one’s body;”25 bodies carry a performative meaning that is distinct 
from the materiality of the body. In making such a claim, Butler transforms the notion of the 
“body as object” to the notion of the “body as matter,” where the materiality of the body is 
understood as an “effect of power.”26 “At stake in such a reformulation of the materiality of 
bodies” Butler attests, “will be…the recasting of the matter of bodies as the effect of a dynamic 
of power, such that the matter of bodies will be indissociable from the regulatory norms that 
govern their materialization and the signification of those material effects...”27 Butler argues that 
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the matter of bodies—the dynamic materialization of the body that is perpetuated through the 
performance of the body’s phenomenal (spatial and temporal) orientation—is, in fact, distinct 
from the materiality or the biological, or in the case of this project, phenotypical disposition of 
the body. Butler utilizes the distinction between sex and gender as an analytic to elucidate this 
point,  
To be female is…a facticity which has no meaning, but to be a 
woman is to have become a woman, to compel the body to 
conform to an historical idea of “woman,” to induce the body to 
become a cultural sign, to materialize oneself in obedience to an 
historically delimited possibility, and to do this as a sustained and 
repeated corporeal project.28 
 
I am concerned with the “sustained and repeated corporeal project,” the performatively citational 
practices of blackness that produces the effect it names, the black body. Specters and Spooks 
invests in understanding the effects produced through the corporeal project of the racialized body 
by developing a hauntology that questions how the regulatory norms of blackness, as conjured 
by the specters of the sociohistorical and socioaesthetic realities of American slavery, have 
become indissociable from bodies that have engaged in the act of “becoming black.”  
Deconstructing the spectral trace of slavery, this undertaking of black hauntology asks, 
similar to reformulations that recognize the distinction between sex and gender, how can the 
ontological construction of the black body be reconfigured to tease out the distinction between 
the “fact of blackness” and “bodies of blackness?”29 Or, as articulated through the language of 
hauntology, how can we understand bodies that have become black as the work of the specter(s) 
of blackness? Specifically focusing the relationship between blackness, phenomenology, history, 
and the body in/as performance, I argue that black bodies are produced through a forced 
relationship with a historized imagining of blackness as/in death. It is the invisible presence of 
this history of death that precedes, extends, and constrains particular bodies, at times hauntingly 
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voicing its presence through those bodies. Put simply, blackness is articulated as “a kind of 
being-toward-death but with something that has been understood as a deathly or death-driven 
nonbeing” forwarding the ontological state of the black body as a perpetual state of being 
haunted by blackness.30  
Personal and Social Rationale 
 I was first aware of the material trace of these specters of blackness in the small town of 
Jena, Louisiana, when, in December of 2006, LaSalle Parish police arrested Robert Bailey, 
Mychal Bell, Theo Shaw, Bryant Purvis, Carwin Jonesand, and Jesse Ray Beard for attacking 
and knocking unconscious a fellow Jena High School student, Justin Barker. The arrests were 
made in the aftermath of a lunchtime brawl that erupted after Barker reportedly referred to one of 
his would-be assailants using a racial epithet encumbered by the weight of centuries-old 
abjection and loathing. Despite Barker’s same-day release from LaSalle General Hospital, the six 
black young men, ranging in age from 14-18, were charged with attempted second-degree 
murder and conspiracy to commit second-degree murder. The public outcry was swift. Local 
Jena officials quickly identified the fight as a symptom of mounting racial tension, instigated in 
August when three nooses bearing the school’s insignia of black, gold, and white, were found 
dangling from a shade tree near the center of campus. The officials reasoned, since LaSalle 
Parish School Superintendent Roy Breithaupt deemed the noose incident an adolescent prank, 
and lightly punished the students responsible with a three-day suspension, Bailey, Bell, Shaw, 
Purvis, Jonesand, and Beard should receive equal favor. The District Attorney’s rejection of this 
proposition would bring the Rev. Al Sharpton, Martin Luther King III, and nearly fifty thousand 
supporters of the, now nationally recognized, “Jena Six” to the small town in Louisiana.  
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Sharpton and King III crafted a captivating array of legal argument and impassioned 
rhetoric that connected the Jena Six to a lingering legacy of violence enacted against black men 
in the United States. “This is the beginning of the 21st century’s civil rights movement,” 
Sharpton affirmed. “In the 20th century, we had to fight for where we sat on the bus. Now, we’ve 
got a fight on how we sit in a courtroom. We’ve gone from plantations to penitentiaries, where 
they have tried to create a criminal justice system that particularly targets our young black men. 
And now we sit and stand in a city that says it’s a prank to hang a hangman’s noose, but that it is 
attempted murder to have a fight. We cannot sit by silently.”31 Sharpton’s poetic sketchings 
firmly positioned the incidents of Jena, Louisiana within the extensive and violent genealogical 
arc of Taussig’s “space of death.” With each attempt to “bring justice” to the Jena Six came an 
overwhelming insistence of their inherited legacy of plantations and penitentiaries, an expression 
of the inextricable bond of the culture of the “conqueror” to that of the “conquered” through a 
pool of signifiers engulfing the black, male body. The result was the transformation of Robert, 
Mychal, Theo, Bryant, Carwin, and Jesse into the “Jena Six,” six black boys articulated through 
the dense spectacle of historical, performative, and cultural imaginings of death, terror, and 
torture enacted on and through black, male bodies.  
With an impatient gaze, I watched the incidents of the Jena Six unfurl from my dormitory 
at Morehouse College. I was at once enthralled and unnerved by the death-driven spectacle of 
bodies that were consumed by entities of blackness and maleness that seemed to exceed their 
individuality. Even through the privilege of my position as a student at one of the nation’s most 
recognized Historically Black Colleges and Universities, I sensed the quieted echoes of what 
Aimé J. Ellis has aptly theorized as, the “call to die”—the pained voicing of one’s close 
proximity to social, imagined, or actual death.32 Ellis contends that contemporary black male 
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subjectivities are formed by this call, which is articulated through a range of death-summoning 
provocations: the threat of death and violence enacted through lynching, state execution, prison, 
poverty, mob violence, acts of insurrection. These death-summoning enunciations construct the 
psychic world which underprivileged, urban black men learn to inhabit. Citing contemporary 
examples such as Christopher Wallace (The Notorious B.I.G.) and Tupac Shakur, Ellis argues 
that heeding the call to die produces a “death-bound effect” in which poor urban black male 
subjects, or as he puts it “young poor urban U.S. black men who are depicted or see themselves 
as ‘niggas’ (i.e. ‘bad niggers,’ gangstas, gangbangers, thugs, as well as social outcasts, high 
school dropouts, and prison inmates),” develop a self-affirming consciousness that produces a 
keen sense of death-defiance in the face of domination.33 
In his monograph If We Must Die, Ellis extends Taussig’s theorizations of the space of 
death by exploring the historical and political deployment of “deathly violence” that leads to the 
formation of black male identities. 34 Ellis argues that “like the slave and lynching epochs that 
preceded it, the persistent threat of (social) death vis-à-vis state sanctioned execution, as well as 
extralegal policing (such as police brutality and prison guard abuse), marks the contemporary 
inheritance and historical continuation of the deployment of social and actual death against black 
people in general and black men in particular.”35 Extending Taussig’s articulation of the space of 
death within the confines of post-modernity, Ellis, in gruesome detail, documents the reality-
making assaults against black bodies in the 20th and 21st centuries; he argues,  
The spectacular and emblematic episodes of racial terror and state 
violence that, for many blacks, both mark and mar twentieth-
/twenty-first century U.S. history, represent a varied array of 
events constituting the living legacy of racial terror and state 
violence: the Red Summer riots of 1919, the Mississippi floods of 
1927, the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment that ran between 1932 
and 1972, Emmett Till’s murder in 1955, assassinations of 
Malcolm X in 1965, Martin Luther King Jr. in 1968, and numerous 
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other black political leaders throughout the era of black militancy, 
the 1963 Ku Klux Klan bombing of a Birmingham church in which 
four black girls were killed, the Watts Uprising of 1965 and those 
that followed throughout the late 1960s, the Vietnam War and 
Project 100,000 (1966-72), the Los Angeles Rebellion of 1992, the 
Cincinnati (2000) and Benton Harbor (2003) Riots, and most 
recently Hurricane Katrina (2005). The global AIDS pandemic, 
too, which has ravaged Africa, South Asia, the Caribbean, and U.S. 
black and gay male communities throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and 
early part of the twenty-first century, serves as a reminder that the 
insidious effects of racial terror and state violence are neither 
unique to black men and women in the United States nor solely 
carried out through the overtly visible force of authoritarian 
subjection but rather exercised through benign neglect, federal 
withdrawal and the increased practice of economic privatization. 36 
 
This thick history of racial terror, which Ellis explicitly defines as “ [the] coercive disciplinary 
practice of social control in which the violent threat of death is exercised against (but not limited 
to) black men through unlawful and extralegal means such as lynching, mob violence, and ‘white 
riots,’” are formational to the ontological and epistemological constitution of blackness.37 The 
modern and post-modern conjunctures are forced to grapple with densely layered hauntings of 
death conjured in the presence of the America’s specters of blackness. Ellis continues to draw 
upon this history to elucidate how these specters also materialize through, what he terms, state 
violence, which “works in tandem with practices of racial terror as a ‘legitimated’ form of social 
control—state-sanctioned execution, the unregulated use of force by the police and prison 
guards, state neglect or inaction, questionable if not dehumanizing social, economic, and health 
care policy measures, denial of human and civil rights—that ensures the deliberate and 
calculated alienation of oppressed people from the state.”38  
Within this powerful, post-modern space of death, the Jena Six are undoubtedly placed; 
the force of racial terror echoes in Barker’s hailing of Robert, Mychal, Theo, Bryant, Carwin, 
and Jesse as “niggers” and its aura outlined the damp silhouette of the school’s centerpiece, until, 
!! 22 
in response to the overwhelming burden of its signification, the tree was axed in August of 2007. 
This terror was only multiplied by the endorsed violence of the state of Louisiana. With each boy 
facing charges that carried a prison sentence of up to one hundred years, the state threatened to 
condemn the defendants to a life of social death. Though ultimately acquitted, the Jena Six had 
been summoned to occupy the space of death through the legacy of racial terror and state 
violence, rehearsing the theatre of existing in nonexistence for audiences separated by the fourth 
wall of national tabloids and network television.  
Despite Barker’s insistence, it is difficult to draw a perfect analogy between the Jena Six 
and Ellis’ prototypical definition of “niggas,” but for the six “young poor urban U.S. black” men 
facing the looming threat of life-long imprisonment, the call to die voiced by the state of 
Louisiana was clear. Its enunciation summoned not only Jena’s six, but drew the national 
imaginary to the Taussig’s space of death as well. But it is in that collective summoning that this 
call was unlike that expressed by Ellis. It was not a call to die in which a death-bound effect of 
defiance is produced, as if it were not always already present. Rather this call could be expressed 
more accurately as a “call of death,” in which the affective forces of being, the pervasive 
potentialities of life and death, suddenly and fully irrupt a body. This call resembled more the 
provocations of literary legend Richard Wright, who admits, through the narrative of his first 
short story, Black Boy,  
I had never in my life been abused by whites, but I had already 
become as conditioned to their existence as though I had been the 
victim of a thousand lynchings…The things that influenced my 
conduct as a Negro did not have to happen to me directly; I needed 
but to hear of them to feel their full effects in the deepest layers of 
my consciousness.”39  
 
As a young, urban, U.S. black male ascending the lower depths of the socioeconomic scale, I had 
never known the abuse of racial terror or state violence but nonetheless sensed the cold 
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awareness of “a thousand lychings”—the anticipation of nonexistence as a result of the 
phenomenal negotiations of my own body in relation to omnipresent imaginings of death. I did 
not hear death-summoning provocations in state-sanctioned threats of death or violence, but I 
intimately felt them on the register of my black and male body.  
My imaginings of a death, a vivid mirage that filled the space of every distant horizon, 
materialized into a performance about Jena’s six. The show, Six Black Boys, began as an 
investigation into the deep-seated racial tensions that occupied the negative space of the 
decimated shade tree. My performative investigation, however, quickly revealed itself for what it 
had always been: a need to find myself in the midst of the collective fears, including my own, of 
a body that is both black and male. Six Black Boys materialized as a personal discovery of the 
lurking presence of death that was voiced through the bodies of the Jena Six. What I had 
intended to unearth, however, was not the haunting of Jena’s history, but the haunting of bodies 
interpellated by that history, and the social, imagined, or actual death that often spawns from that 
relation.  
Against The Black Body as a Universal Signifier: Assumption, Limitations, and 
Delimitations    
Reliant on autoethnograpy and performance ethnography, Six Black Boys used my own 
subjectivity as the embodied nodal point of blackness through which conceptions of masculinity, 
class, and educational capital intersect. Specters and Spooks both extends the work of that project 
and benefits from my critical reflexivity of the project. In doing so, it seeks to develop a 
theorization of blackness as/in haunting with an acute awareness of social and class privilege, as 
well as the (near) universality granted by my gendered orientation. This critical reflexivity begins 
by understanding that rooting the genealogy of blackness through a deep corporeal knowledge of 
haunting exposes an arcane neurosis that, Frantz Fanon suggests, emerges from my position of 
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privilege. Arguing that the alienating process of internal intrusion and near possession is the only 
means of knowing one’s own black body marks a desire, a plea perhaps, to announce the 
separation between my self and my race. In Fanon’s words,  
The educated black man, slave of the myth of the spontaneous and 
cosmic Negro, feels at some point in time that his race no longer 
understands him. Or that he no longer understands his race. He is 
only too pleased about this, and by developing further this 
difference, this incomprehension and discord, he discovers the 
meaning of his true humanity. Less commonly he wants to feel a 
part of his people. And with feverish lips and frenzied heart he 
plunges into the great black hole. We shall see that this 
wonderfully generous attitude rejects the present and future in the 
name of a mystical past.40  
 
I read Fanon’s words as a warning that brings to light the epistemic violence my project 
is in danger of performing. The Jena Six project, indeed, marked the felt distance between 
myself, as a supposed steward of the ivory tower, and the community of racially marked men 
who precariously existed somewhere beyond the porcelain veneers that frames so much of my 
subjectivity. Aware of my privilege and the distance it necessarily creates, I resist positioning my 
body and the knowledges contained therein as the universal signifier of the phenomenal 
experience of blackness. Instead, I offer Specters and Spooks as a writing from here, my body, 
about the somewhere I imagine my body to be. I write in the gap of the phenomenal distance—
the “great black hole”— perceived through the experience of my body. The former project 
manifested as an articulation of that distance by investigating the space between my body and 
bodies of the same genealogical arc. This project delves deeper into the phenomenal space of 
blackness by interrogating not only the space between bodies, but the sociopolitical and 
socioaesthetic configurations that precede those spatial orientations. Through this investigation I, 
as Fanon suggests, return to the mystical past, but to neither reject the present nor the future. 
Rather, I intellectually, creatively, and phenomenally gesture toward “true humanity” at its 
!! 25 
fullest capacity as it is expressed through the phenomenal experience that have formed the 
performative composite of my body, blackness and maleness.   
Aware of these experiential biases, I do not claim that my articulation of the ontological 
construction of the black body is universal. In fact it is far from it, for the black body and 
blackness, this project will demonstrate, is not, nor could ever be, an entity purely comprehended 
through the metaphysics of ontology. Blackness is, instead, understood through the dynamic 
confluence of affective ecologies of experience and the phenomenal orientation of corporeal 
knowledge(s) that work in concert to constitute my body as black. I understand that the 
relationships one’s individual body has to these affective ecologies and phenomenal orientations 
are distinguished from the next. For me, that distinction comes not only from my position as an 
academic, but, is additionally a result of seeing blackness through lens of a masculinized 
heteronormativity. I understand blackness through the temporal and spatial orientations that are 
inflicted with a dense gender specificity, the inherent “male” lurking as a specter in its own right, 
between the black (male) body, conflating race, gender, and sex into the unified form of 
blackness. Following Hortense J. Spillers and Saidiya Hartman, I recognize the origins of 
masculinity in the corporeal project of the black body. And while my project works to outline the 
affective ecologies of gender and sex that work, in conjunction with specters of abjection and 
death, to frame contemporary manifestations of blackness, it is intentionally insufficient in its 
deconstruction of those ecologies.  Nonetheless, the gendered configuration contained within this 
genealogy of the black body is important to my study.  
My genealogical investigations begin with the Transatlantic Slave Trade and a distinction 
drawn between flesh and body. Spillers theorizes flesh as the material facticity of the body, the 
biological, and in our case, epidermal, matter. From this Spillers articulates the Transatlantic 
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Slave Trade as “crimes against the flesh, as the person of African females and African males 
registered the wounding. If we think of ‘flesh’ as a primary narrative, then we mean its seared, 
divided, ripped-apartness, riveted to the ship’s hole, fallen, or ‘escaped’ overboard.”41 In 
contrast, the body is the social and cultural construction of a symbolic double of the flesh. The 
body materializes across time and space and serves as a focus point for the convergence of 
“biological, sexual, social, cultural, linguistic, ritualistic, and psychological fortunes.”42 The 
writing on the flesh of the captive body in the Transatlantic Slave Trade signals “‘a theft of the 
body’—a willful and violent (and unimaginable from this distance) severing of the captive body 
from its will, its active desires” (author’s emphasis).43  
Spillers provides a teleology, of sorts, that narrates the pivotal move of powerlessness 
from the flesh to the body.44 The transition occurs with mutilation of the flesh—“eyes beaten out, 
arms, backs, skulls branded, a left jaw, a right ankle, punctured: teeth missing, as the calculated 
work of iron, whips chains, knives, the canine patrol, the bullet.”45 The mutilation that was 
enacted upon the flesh was transfixed onto the body. Spillers puts it this way: “These 
undecipherable markings on the captive body render a kind of hieroglyphics of the flesh whose 
severe disjunctures come to be hidden to the cultural seeing by skin color. “This body,” she 
continues, “whose flesh carries the female and the male to the frontiers of survival bears in 
person the marks of a cultural text whose inside has been turned outside.”46 Through the act of 
turning the flesh inside out and dragging the male and female body to and through the “frontier 
of survival,” the black body is epistemologically flattened within a regime of powerlessness. 
Under the conditions of the “theft of a body,” “we lose at least gender difference in the outcome, 
and the female body and the male body become a territory of cultural and political maneuver, not 
at all gender-related, gender-specific.”47 What Spillers marks is not an erasure of gender, rather 
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the powerlessness of the body that is marked through visual significations of blackness within 
the flesh, yet uniquely materializes through the phenomenal orientations of the body. An 
example is provided through the daily economies of slavery, in which female slaves were 
subjected to countless atrocities of sexual violence, forced to bear the weight of powerlessness in 
the womb and propagate the ecologies of death through the act of birth.  Though both male and 
female slaves are possessed by the powerlessness inherent to their flesh, that powerlessness 
materializes through markedly divergent techniques of brutalization.    
It was this very regime of powerlessness, and the suppression of gender distinction, that 
former slaves attempted to overcome during American Reconstruction. Such an effort, Hartman 
explains, was facilitated through a two-sided attempt to re-fashion the former slave into laboring 
citizens.48 Government agencies such as the Freedman’s Bureau and congressional law such as 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the 14th Amendment advocated that rights of equality be 
extended to freedmen, but only in the event of the freedmens’ complete transformation into 
rational and responsible, that is to say docile and laboring, citizens. The forces behind fashioning 
a black citizenry are simultaneously responsible for conflating notions of race and manhood. As 
Hartman points out, “The presumed whiteness and maleness of the citizen transposed the 
particular into the universal, thus enabling white men to enjoy the privileges of abstraction and a 
noncorporeal universality.”49 Former slaves aspiring equality were subject to the whiteness and 
maleness already prescribed in citizenship. Their grasps at constitutional and legal equality 
manifested into a process of self-making in which they assumed performative strategies 
indicative of “rationality” and “responsibility.” This process necessarily involved assuming the 
maleness of citizenship, as the whiteness of citizenship was beyond the former slave’s 
(epidermal) purview. Simply put, power was represented through whiteness and maleness, while 
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contrarily powerlessness was characteristic of blackness and femaleness. Since citizenship stood 
in direct opposition to enslaved bondage, this (white) masculinity dug its way into the 
reformulation of blackness forcing the recently enslaved to reinscribe its performative script.  
In this light, blackness becomes the performative manifestation of Spiller’s theft of the 
body, where the will and power of the body is negated, and blackness and manhood are 
conflated. In the aftermath of slavery, this negation is not enacted through the literal death of the 
body, but by dragging the imaginative and phenomenal body to the frontier of survival. The 
result is the constitution of blackness through, what I call, a performative hauntology of death, 
which, I argue, continues to structure an ontological position of blackness in the contemporary 
moment. Blackness operates within a politics that can not be condensed within identificatory 
terms of the body, but rather operates through social relationality of the flesh. Blackness 
materializes through the life and death that exists between “subjects normatively defined as 
black, the relations among blacks, whites, and others, and the practices that produce racial 
difference.”50 
It is at this darkened crossroad of death and corporeality that I turn to Derrida’s spectral 
force of hauntology to investigate the corporeally implications of becoming black. Developing 
this hauntology of blackness foregrounds how the discursive formation of the black body fixes 
meanings of ontological blackness within specular and spectacular histories of death. A 
melancholy drama played out through the epidermal script of the body as “the inescapable prison 
house of the flesh.” 51 This hauntology of blackness, then, begins by tracing the affective, 
anachronistic forces conjured by the spirit of slavery to recuperate the institution’s spectral traces 
in the film and fiber of being (black). 
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Outline of Chapters   
Each chapter herein considers the techniques of brutal corporealization performed by the 
specters of blackness, a presence “as powerful as it is unreal.”52 Chapter 2, “When the Specter 
Spooks: Constructing Blackness Through a Performative Hauntology of Death,” triangulates 
Derrida’s theorization of hauntology, Orlando Patterson’s seminal text, Slavery and Social 
Death: A Comparative Study, and Hartman’s Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-
Making in Nineteenth Century America to articulate how the forced performative interplay with 
death founded the political and social performances of the slave’s body. As such, the slave’s 
“phenomenal and carnal form,” that is to say the performative and material manifestations of 
slave’s dark body, became the site upon which the affective excesses of loss and death were 
conjoined with the agential force of existence. Within these ecologies, a specter of blackness was 
conjured as an amalgamated affect of death, which was then delicately reduced into an epidermal 
schema and grafted onto the body of the slave. The slave’s body, I argue, mutated into something 
that is best described as a becoming-body of a specter. This chapter excavates “the historical 
transmission and dissemination” of the death-driven cultural practices of slavery encoded and 
decoded through representational and performative practices that are enacted through and within 
lived bodies. The chapter attempts to understand how the performative hauntology of death 
propels the specter of blackness to become a second-skin that always-already proceeds, and thus 
haunts, particular bodies. In this performative relationship, the specter assumes a 
phenomenological reality that continues to connect black bodies to this performative hauntology 
of death.   
Chapter 3, “The Grief of a Negro’s Home: Beloved and the Failed Mourning of 
Blackness,” furthers the investigation of black hauntology by articulating the pathological effects 
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of the relationship between blackness and death. Guided by Derrida’s first constitutive element 
of haunting, mourning, this chapter argues that the ontological becoming act of the black body, a 
body inhabited by the invisible force of death conjured through it’s own visual and biological 
disposition, is set in motion through the act of failed mourning. Using Fanon and the 
psychoanalytic queries of Joan Copjec, this chapter advances the hauntology of blackness by 
considering the psychoanalytic consequences of a body subsumed by the dark, affective, and 
seemingly autonomous forces of death made present by the specter of blackness.  
Chapter 4, “Descend: To Fall into the Specter’s Voice,” interrogates the theorizations of 
Fred Moten, Frank B. Wilderson, among others to advance this hauntology by considering 
Derrida’s second element of haunting, voice. The chapter questions how the temporal 
disjointment announced through the apparition’s aurality leads to an ontological descent. Within 
this underworld of blackness, the body and the self  are drawn to the borders of becoming, where 
it is inhabited from the inside by a specter who hails the subject into a multiplicity of 
presents/presence; a law that both precedes and constrains the witness, positioning the subject, 
like the specter, on the borders of being and nonbeing, presence and absence, life and death.  
Beneath the aches and moans of disjointment, beyond the sound of spooks and specters, 
there exists possibility. The concluding fifth chapter of Specters and Spooks, “Haimatja: Home,” 
deconstructs Derrida’s final element of haunting, work. It understands the work of the specter of 
blackness as it phenomenally manifests through the factic materiality of the body. Attempting to 
deconstruct the citational link between the specter and bodies of blackness, Chapter 5 forwards a 
politics of performance that seeks to interrupt the cycle of haunting and enliven new 
relationships between the history of the black body and the phenomenal experience of blackness.  
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Conjuring the presence of spirits, Specters and Spooks questions how the deathly call of 
blackness, emerging on the haunting grounds of the American planation, makes a body not only 
knowable to itself, but to those who stand to witness as well. The project evokes the language of 
haunting and its embodied relationship to death to investigate the phenomenal and 
psychoanalytic construction of the black body, as the sociohistorical, socioaesthetic, and 
performative manifestations of the specter of blackness, that which haunts the imaginary and 
sociality of post-modernity. However, this project does not narrate the story of slavery, though it 
is dredged through the force of its existence. It is, instead, a story about bodies performing the 
prosaic choreographies of possibility; bodies that burn with the sensations of absence and 
memory, life and death, learning the nature of haunting by being, themselves, haunted.
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CHAPTER 2: WHEN THE SPECTER SPOOKS: CONSTRUCTING BLACKNESS 
THROUGH A PERFORMATIVE HAUNTOLOGY OF DEATH 
“Ghosts are the signals of atrocities, marking sites of an untold violence, a traumatic past whose 
traces remain to attest to the fact of a lack of testimony. A haunting does not initiate a story; it is 
the sign of a blockage of story, a hurt that has been not honored by a memorializing narrative.”53 
 
Roger Luckhurst 
 
 Specters: Haunting and the Metaphysics of Presence  
 “A specter is haunting Europe—the specter of communism;” a pronouncement 
that begins both the prelude to Marx’s most influential work, and Derrida’s intervention to 
expose the spectral affect inherent to notions of ontology.54 In questioning the fundamental 
assumptions of “what it is to Be” Derrida holds, “learning to live—[if it] remains to be done, it 
can only happen between life and death. Neither in life nor in death alone.”55 As such, Derrida 
explains “to be” is to “live with ghosts, in the upkeep, the conversation, the company, or the 
companionship…of ghost…And this being-with specters would also be, not only but also, a 
politics of memory, of inheritance, and of generations.”56 Derrida, therefore, forwards the notion 
of hauntology as a synonymic surrogate of ontology, offering a more extensive articulation of 
being that accounts for the spectral affect of both presence and absence.  
My investigation builds upon this restructuring of ontology to expose the incomplete 
rendering of blackness as an entity made ontologically stable through a metaphysics of presence. 
Instead it gives close attention to the forces of absence that work in equal force to constitute the 
black subject. This chapter delves into the corporeal implications of the hauntologizing of
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blackness, dealing with/in ghosts to understand blackness as the confluence of a politics of 
history (memory), justice (inheritance), and temporality (generations). Asking, what are the 
implications for bodies thrust into the process of becoming black by those very same dimensions 
of memory, inheritance, and generation, this chapter invests in Derrida’s nuanced theorization of 
being as “hantise,” translated within the text to mean, “haunting.”  
Rummaging the etymology of the term reveals its emergence from the early 12th century 
Old French term “hanter” meaning “to frequent,” “to resort to,” or “to inhabit.” Not far off is its 
13th century Middle English cousin, “haunten” meaning, “to reside or inhabit.” Derrida takes up 
the connation of inhabitation to offer a logic of haunting, which marks a presence that is 
“inhabited in its inside, that is, haunted by a foreign guest.”57 He offers haunting as a “sense of 
obsession, a constant fear, a fixed idea, or a nagging memory.”58 Finally, Derrida pulls from the 
term’s Germanic origins a verb that speaks of home,“haimatja,” meaning “to lead home.” 
Through these etymological traces Derrida begins to consider the ontology of “haunting,” a 
notion reinforced through a classic Shakespearian texts, as the term was first recorded in “A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream” around 1590.59 Simultaneously marking Marx’s obsession with the 
playwright, Derrida uses Shakespeare as an analytic to further elaborate his theorizations. 
 “As in Hamlet, the Prince of a rotten State” Derrida narrates, “everything begins by the 
apparition of a specter.”60 On the peripheries of Elsinore Castle, a phantom of the former king 
thrice appears as the supernatural vessel of the spirit of King Hamlet. And Horatio’s witnessing 
of the former King’s mid-night appearance, indeed, inaugurates the story of lustful sin and 
maddening revenge founded upon the buried spirits of a rotten State. “What manifests itself in 
the first place,” Derrida describes, “is a specter, this first paternal character, as powerful as it is 
unreal, a hallucination or simulacrum that is virtually more actual that what is so blithely called a 
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living presence.”61 The specter manifests not only on the outlying threshold of the Elsinore 
estate, but on the liminal borders between being and nonbeing as well, appearing as an entity 
with a phenomenal and tangible body that is “inhabited from the inside” by the affective and 
invisible force of a spirit. “[W]hat distinguishes the specter…from the spirit” Derrida explains, 
“is the furtive and ungraspable visibility of the invisible…the tangible intangibility of a proper 
body without flesh, but still the body of someone as someone other. (his emphasis)62 The specter 
is the bodily, and therefore phenomenal, successor of the spirit.  It is that which follows the 
spirit, but not as the matter of time, for, according to Derrida, haunting is situated out of time; it 
is historical, but not dated.63 Rather, the spirit precedes the specter in sentience, as the spirit is 
the specter without body. Derrida reads the specter as “a paradoxical incorporation, the 
becoming-body, a certain phenomenal and carnal form of the spirit. It becomes, rather, some 
‘thing’ that remains difficult to name: neither soul nor body, and both one and the other.”64 The 
apparition of King Hamlet’s ghost appears in this liminal space of spectrality, where his body 
becomes something other than its factic materiality; it becomes a phenomenal manifestation of 
absence, invisibility, and intangibility.  
As an entity caught between the continual return of absence through presence, the specter 
positions the logics of haunting within spaces of becoming. For it is not until the specter spooks, 
not until the invisible and absent become and are beheld in their becoming, that the full drama of 
being is thrust into action. As we witness the witnessing of Horatio, and ultimately Hamlet, we 
come to understand the specter of King Hamlet as the becoming-body of the invisible affective 
forces of Denmark, as the State’s existence rots in the hands of a spoiled king. Through this, the 
specter is understood not only a manifestation of the affective forces that exist, no less unseen, in 
the spaces between the body itself and the resonances of its remains, but, in appearing, makes 
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manifest the unseen forces that operate in the grounds of its haunting as well.65 For Derrida, 
haunting occurs in the play between spirit and specter. “The specter is of the spirit,” Derrida 
begins, “it participates in the latter and stems from it even as it follows it as its ghostly double.”66 
The spirit is conceived as an ecology of invisible, affective force. The specter, then, is the 
materialization of a body that appears autonomous, but is in fact, “inhabited from the inside,” 
that is, consumed by the affective force of the spirit.  
The spirit is a figure that is extended from a body, but, through trickery, has assumed 
autonomy from the body of its origin. The “conjuring trick” of the spirit is its ability to masks its 
genesis, to hide from its originary source.67 The trick occurs when, in fleeing from its origin, the 
spirit “inhabits from the inside” another form; a second body. “…there is never any becoming-
specter of the spirit without at least an appearance of flesh, in a space of invisible visibility…For 
there to be ghost, there must be a return to the body, but to a body that is more abstract than 
ever…”68 Continuing Derrida explains that it is “Not by returning to the living body from which 
ideas and thoughts have been torn loose, but by incarnating the latter in another artifactual body, 
a prosthetic body, a ghost of spirits…”69 The spirit animates this second body, causing the 
citational link between itself and the body of its origin to disappear by provoking a hallucination 
of the appearance of its own autonomy; becoming through disappearance.70 This second body, to 
which Derrida refers to as “a body without nature,” “a technical body or an institutional body,”71 
artifactual and prosthetic, becomes a hyper-phenomenal body that dwells on the borders of 
phenomenal presence and spiritual absence, between sentience and non-sentience, between the 
visible presence and the invisible absence of the body’s citationality. This is the specter that 
haunts, the dead that dwells amongst the living. And as Derrida, following Marx and 
Shakespeare, articulates, the act of the specter’s becoming manifests through the confluence of 
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three constitutive elements: mourning, voice, and work. 
The second scene of Shakespeare’s inspired tale voices the layered tragedy of Denmark’s 
first son, as Hamlet publicly mourns his lost father during the celebratory announcement of his 
mother’s new king. It is no accident that this scene, fuelled by both Hamlet’s and Horatio’s 
prolonged mourning, is couched between apparitions of the ghostly father. The act of mourning 
vigorously seeks to draw the presence of the lost and dead near. Mourning, Derrida writes, 
“consists always in attempting to ontologize remains, to make them present, in the first place by 
identifying the bodily remains and by localizing the dead.”72 The work of mourning requires one 
to know “who is buried where,” however, Derrida urges, “it is necessary (to know—to make 
certain) that, in what remains of him, he remain there. Let him stay there and move no more!” 
(his emphasis)73  
Within this act of mourning, however, is a reciprocal gaze that negates this command. 
The work of mourning, in which both Hamlet and Horatio are engaged, leads each to the exterior 
limits of Elsinore Castle, where they bear witness to the ethereal presence of the dead. An 
encounter that provokes Horatio to confess, “By my God, I might not this believe/Without the 
sensible and true avouch/ Of mine own eyes.” 74 Caught in the interpellative gaze, each man 
identifies the ghost through the stark resemblance of the shadowy figure to the king’s former 
self. Horatio remarks, “Such was the very armour he had on/When he the ambitious Norway 
combated;/So frown'd he once, when, in an angry parle, /He smote the sledded Polacks on the 
ice./Tis’ strange.”75 The interpellative act of mourning, and the ontologizing and localizing of 
remains that necessarily follow, provides the grounds for the dead’s already-emergent status as 
specter. Drawn from the undercroft, the dead conjoins the affective excesses of loss with the 
agential force of existence to become specter—“the tangible intangibility of a proper body 
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without flesh, but still the body of someone as someone other.”  
A constitutive element of the spirit’s becoming, however, is its ability to be ontologized 
and localized through mourning while eluding identification, an act achieved by taking residence 
in the liminal space of spectrality. In this space of becoming, the spirit capitalizes upon the 
interpellative gaze of mourning by performing the conjuring trick of disappearance, which 
allows the spirit to provoke the hallucination of autonomy while concealing its origin in the 
artifactual and prosthetic body of the specter. In this hyper-phenomenal state, the spirit 
inhabiting the body of the specter is able to move in the realm of the living without being seen. 
As Shakespeare narrates, the spirit that haunts Hamlet returns (to the living) not only in the 
spectral body, but the armor, of the lost king, which works to further mask the spirit’s presence. 
This armory negates the reciprocity of the gaze of mourning by establishing an asymmetrical 
relationship between the specter and witness. This, what Derrida describes as the visor and 
helmet effects, grants the specter the ability, perhaps power, to see without being seen, enhanced 
only by a power yielded by the apparition’s helmet to speak in order to be heard. And this ability 
to see and speak without being identified allows the spectral illusionist to maintain his 
hallucinations, to hide the rabbit of time inside the hats of visuality and aurality, manipulating all 
as needed. The specter conceals the spirit’s origin, and the armor camouflages the specter’s 
presence by granting it an enhanced phenomenality.  
The camouflage of the specter plays a particularly important role; through it the witness 
is interpellated as the recipient of the spectral gaze before any act of recognition occurs. As 
Derrida puts it, “this spectral someone other looks at us, we feel ourselves being looked at by it, 
outside of any synchrony, even before and beyond any look on our part, according to an absolute 
anteriority….” (his emphasis)76 As such the witness becomes the subject of, is constituted 
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through, the furtive gaze that can never be returned. “[T]his thing that looks at us, that concerns 
us,” Derrida writes “comes to defy semantics as much as ontology, psychoanalysis as much as 
philosophy.”77 Through this act of furtive looking, temporality and ontology are collapsed 
onto/into the body of the witness; s/he becomes the body in the present that has yet to look, the 
future body that will look, and the past body that has been looked at. This collapse of time and 
ontology throws those whom the specter haunts into a disjointed temporality that begins to 
constitute the ontological positioning of the witness—“Here anachrony makes the law”78—
ushering those who witness it to the liminal space of becoming.  
 The haunted subject, however, is not solely constituted through the visual (inter)play of 
the spirit and specter, but through the specter’s tricks of aurality as well. The ontological 
liminality of the witness is not fully materialized until it is articulated through the second 
constitutive element of the specter’s haunting, voice. As Derrida explains, “Since we do not see 
the one who sees us, and who makes the law, who delivers the injunction we must fall back on its 
voice. The one who says ‘I am thy Fathers Spirit’ can only be taken at his word.” (author’s 
emphasis)79 The spirit again manipulates aurality and visuality by exploiting the reciprocity 
inherent in its interpellative call to submit the witness to “an essentially blind submission to [the 
spirit’s] secret, to the secret of his origin: this is a first obedience to the injunction. It will 
condition all the others.”80 The voice of the specter performs the act of becoming through this 
blind submission, forging another carnal existence of the spirit by phenomenally extending to 
and through Hamlet’s body to inhabit the state of Denmark. The voice of King Hamlet’s specter 
is heard in the thrice-performed speech act of the swear, which obligates Hamlet, Horatio, and 
Marcellus to preserve the secret of the apparition’s presence. The secret of the specter grants 
Hamlet the ability to, in the words of the ghost, “Revenge his foul and most unnatural murder.”81 
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The interpellative calls of the specter signifies not only the ails of the rotten State, but, as 
Hamlet’s provocative fall into a death-driven madness demonstrates, hails the unsuspecting 
witness into a ghosted constitution. This ontological and temporal descent is the driving force of 
Shakespeare’s plot, beginning with the apparition’s coxing of young Prince Hamlet into a 
frenzied ontological obsession, feigned or not, which crescendos in his most notable soliloquy. 
 Explaining this (inter)play between the spirit, specter, and witness, Derrida articulates 
the last constitutive element of the specter as work. “Finally, the thing works, whether it 
transforms or transforms itself, poses or decomposes itself: the spirit, the ‘spirit of the spirit’ is 
work” (his emphasis).82 Through tricks of aurality and visuality, the spirit is invested with the 
“certain power of transformation,” poses and decomposes itself within the bodies of both the 
specter and the specter’s interpellated witness. The affective work of the specter manifests in the 
body of the witness, as the witness is transformed through the specter’s hailing to become the 
phenomenal vessel of the spirit; the “spirit of the spirit,” an “artifactual” body of phenomenal 
realness/presence/existence, but also a body of spectral simulacrum.83 Through an internal 
habitation the witness is compelled to become the shadow of the spirit, which is conjured and 
subsequently camouflaged through manipulative conjuring tricks of visuality, aurality, and 
temporality.  
The body of the witness becomes, what Derrida refers to as, the revenant, a body whose 
essence is structured upon a spirit of clandestine origin. Situated in this second body, between 
presence and absence, the spirit becomes a trickster of temporality, as the defining characteristic 
of the revenant is “coming back for the first time.”84 The spirit will return for the first time to 
inhabit the realm of phenomenality through the being of “someone other.”85 Although the 
inhabitation of the second body is for the first time, it is a simultaneous return of the spirit that 
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escaped its originary body, as we see in the king’s inspirited or inspired body that returns home 
to Denmark. In the animation of the second body, the spirit inside becomes the animating force 
of the revenant, the hyper-phenomenal, living-dead. For, as Derrida explains, “it is flesh and 
phenomenality that give to the spirit its spectral apparition, but which disappear right away in the 
apparition, in the very coming of the revenant or the return of the specter.”86 The witness is both 
the haunted and the haunting, hailed by the deathly call of the specter to be possessed, that is 
inhabited from the inside by the spirit, which condemns the body to carry the spectral weight of 
the spirit’s presence.      
This triangulated spectral affect between the spirit, specter, and witness is the crux of 
Derrida’s notion of haunting, in which the absent presence of the spirit’s being is conjured 
through the body of the witness, throwing time out of joint. Performing the trick of presence in 
absence, the witness, as the revenant, is ontologically oriented within a multiplicity of 
temporalities: “le temps, the temporality of time,” or the things time makes possible; “l’histoire,” 
the way things are at a certain point, the time in which we are living; and “monde,” or “the world 
as it turns, our world today, our today, currentness itself.”87 Oriented by these three modalities, 
the revenant signifies (again, for the first time) the dislocation of time within ontology. The body 
of the revenant signifies a being out of time, for it is not the matter of time, that is, it exists 
outside of le temps, but nonetheless is situated within l’histoire and monde. Within this dislodged 
temporality, the revenant’s body performs the affective work of the specter, visually and aurally 
announcing the spirit’s interpellative cry that demands the blind submission of its witness. 
Within the voiced presence of the revenant, time—le temps, l’histoire, monde—or in Hamlet’s 
case, the state of Denmark, is consumed by the affective, anachronistic law of the spirit.      
Following Marx’s investigation of the affective forces of communism that famously 
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consumed ninetieth century Europe, Derrida traces the ontology of postmodernity through the 
spectral excess of Marx’s frightened and frightening quasi-paternal phantom. Tempering the 
contingency of scholars overwrought with jubilee at the fall of the Soviet Union, Derrida 
positions the U.S.S.R. as a revenant structured upon the secret genesis of the spirit of 
communism. This spirit, particularly as it is ontologized and localized in the settled dust of the 
Berlin Wall, will continue to engineer an improper habitation of post-modernity by situating the 
conjuncture within communism’s ecology of affective forces. The haunting of post-modernity is 
the felt in the spectral forces that, since Marx, consciously or unconsciously submit the socio-
political, economic, and ontological axioms of the time to the injunctions of the spirit. “[T]here 
has been this appeal beginning with a word the resounds before us,” Derrida recites, the ‘since’ 
marks a place and time that doubtless precedes us, but so as to be as much in front of us as before 
us…‘since Marx’ continues to designate the place of assignation from which we are pledged” 
(his emphasis).88 Post-modernity is bound to, pledged to, the corporeal absence contained within 
Marx’s, and therefore communism’s, spectral presence. 
Speaking back to the specter and spirit to which the ontological foundations of post-
modernity are sworn, Derrida develops a hauntology of post-modernity that interrogates the 
ontologization and localization of Marx as the becoming-body of the specter of communism. The 
logic of the ghost locates the question of ontology between the contingent forces of absence and 
presence, visibility and invisibility, the being and nonbeing. Arguing that “the logic of haunting 
would not be merely larger and more powerful than ontology or a thinking of Being…It would 
harbor within itself, but like circumscribed places and particular effects, eschatology and 
teleology themselves,” Derrida forwards hauntology to consider the affective work of the specter 
in the production of knowledge within an episteme, sketching imperceptible constellations of 
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memory, inheritance, and generation, which interpellates the episteme into the ghostly presence 
of the invisible.  
The ghosts, spirits, and specters this project attempts to exorcise are those whose 
presence makes visible the affective ecologies of American slavery, and draws near the liminal 
space of becoming that constitute the ontology of the bodies who “stand as witness” to the 
atrocities of that institution. Furthering Derrida’s recognition of the attenuation of ontology 
through the metaphysics of presence, I develop a hauntology of blackness to articulate the 
haunting of the specter that functions as the generative force of black ontology in the Americas, 
an apparition that has journeyed centuries to inspire the here and now of the contemporary 
moment with its ghostly charisma.  
Spooks: The Ecologies of Nonexistence in a Performative Hauntology of Death  
“Haunting is a constituent element of modern social life,” sociologist Avery F. Gordon 
claims, it articulates the “lingering inheritance of racial slavery…the compulsions and forces that 
all of us inevitably experience in the face of slavery’s having even once existed in our nation.”89 
This project interrogates the work of the specter of blackness by recognizing slavery as the 
designated “place of assignation from which we are pledged…” or, the place that is “as much in 
front of us as before us.”90 This inquiry into the language of haunting proceeds by developing a 
black hauntology to question how the affective work of the dead forges the ontological frame of 
those who stand to witness the conjuring of blackness; a presence that, even in its absence, is 
always there.  
Speaking back to the ghosts and spirits of American slavery, Specters and Spooks 
interrogates the ontological foundations to which the black body is sworn, tracing the spectral 
means by which the experience of blackness is articulated onto bodies, enacted, and performed 
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through space and in time. The spectral trace of chattel slavery reveals the temporal dislocation 
produced in the presence of its “lingering inheritance.” The institution of slavery was constituted 
through an ecology of anachronistic forces that grant specters, which were conjured on the 
haunting grounds of the American plantation, the faculty to exist both within and beyond the 
modalities of time, mattering in time without being matter of time, a point further elaborated 
through Gordon’s exposition. “Slavery has ended,” she explains, “but something of it continues 
to live on, in the social geography of where peoples reside, in the authority of collective wisdom 
and shared benightedness, in the veins of the contradictory formations we call New World 
modernity…”91 Gordon alludes to the dislodged temporality in which the specter(s) of blackness 
are positioned, sketching the specters’ armored silhouette—the “something” of slavery that 
persists in the visual and aural registers of the specters’ trace. Mobilizing the phenomenological 
method advanced by Merleau-Ponty, which forwards the body as the primary site of human 
subjectivity, this investigation argues that the residual “something” of slavery is the continual act 
of becoming achieved by the specter(s) of blackness. The result of this haunting is the 
phenomenal consumption of bodies moving through social geographies, of the imaginaries 
structured upon the collective wisdom of those bodies, and of the foundations of modernity by 
which those bodies are governed. 
The first chapter began by articulating this presence as a specter, but the confluence of 
spectral forces within a racially marked body is perhaps more accurately articulated as a spook. 
“[T]he word spook,” writes David Marriott, “reveals a connection between race and terror, magic 
and surveillance, idolatry and power: as a verb it makes visible the impenetrable unseen that our 
self-deceptions bid us master and so keep at a remove.”92 Introduced into the American 
vernacular as a derogatory racial slur in the 1940s, the term conjures images of dark faces made 
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darker with layers of burnt cork, as minstrelsy performatively reiterates Spillers’ articulate of the 
theft of the body. This project broadens the connotation of the term to include the historicized 
amalgam of visual and aural representations of bodies hailed by the specter of blackness and 
thrust into the drama of becoming (black).93 The visuality and phenomenality of the enslaved, 
African descended body made manifest the affective registers of death summoned by the 
institution of slavery. This hauntology, then, is founded upon the historical politics of blackness 
in the Americas, a politics articulated through the Transatlantic histories of slavery’s affective 
ecologies of nonexistence, which structured the phenomenal, imaginative, and performative 
conditions of possibility for the slave’s body. 
The very question of being (black) is written upon the ancestral flesh of the captive, and 
articulated through an overlapping matrix of agential subjection, coerced liberation, and the 
confluence of pained nonbeing within the empathetic existence of speaking bodies. The affective 
ecologies of nonexistence are articulated in Orlando Patterson’s seminal text, Slavery and Social 
Death: A Comparative Study. Patterson maintains that the regulation of the American slave 
population through the institution’s thrice-folded exertion of power—1) the invisible-yet-felt 
force of death enacted through social relations, 2) the psychological influence that follows, and 
3) the sustained control of the cultural modes of production—constituted the captive within a 
culture of living-death.94 The inability to possess social and political life sought to produce a 
docile subject intimately bonded to the institution’s affective ecologies of death and 
nonexistence.95 No longer only conditioned through genealogical, social, and physical death, the 
slave’s body was ontologically flattened within phenomenal, imaginative, and performative 
contours of nonexistence as well. Patterson’s study is a vivid articulation of the construction of 
African captivity in America at the intersection of power relations, knowledge, and the body. 
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The remainder of this chapter explores the first facet of the power exerted upon the body through 
slavery, the affective force of death.    
Patterson’s theorizations of the invisible-yet-felt force of death are in intimate 
conversation with Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, in which he explains how apparatuses of the 
state such as prisons, clinics, and hospitals produce a knowledge of the body that exceeds the 
body itself. Foucault writes “…there may be a ‘knowledge’ of the body that is not exactly the 
science of its functioning, and a mastery of its forces that is more than the ability to conquer 
them; this knowledge and this mastery constitute what might be called the political technology of 
the body.” 96 These technologies restrict the body from extending into its co-inhabited space by, 
quite literally, removing the body from that space. The force of these technologies, what I refer 
to as, affective ecologies, exert a powerful control over the performance of a body, both in the 
sense of the tasks the body fulfills and in how the body is performatively expressed in the world. 
Extending Patterson’s claims, I argue that the forced performative interplay between the slave’s 
body and enactments of death performed on the American planation produced a knowledge that 
exceeded the body itself; the slave’s body was saturated with affective ecologies of nonexistence, 
which became the foundation of black ontology in the Americas. Slavery’s culture of death 
structured the understanding of what blackness was, and what blackness could be, mutating the 
phenotype of the body into an inescapable, signifier of pained death.  
The ontological conditions of death are unfurled in Hartman’s investigation of the 
nuanced configuration of black subjectivity. She argues that the ontological existence of black 
bodies, hinged upon the body of the captive, is rooted in the “spectacular character of black 
suffering” and a “denial of black sentience.”97 Slavery, and the captives it claimed, is 
ontologically flattened within the embodiment of pain expressed through the spectacular 
!! 46 
representation of those bodies. The body of the captive was formed—made (non)human—
through the spectacular and embodied expression of prolonged death. Hartman articulates that 
black subjectivity is bound to spectacular scenes of subjection and objection. She draws upon the 
autobiography of Frederick Douglas as he recounts the scene of his Aunt Hester’s beating. 
Douglass’s witnessing of the spectacle of pain enacted against his aunt was, according to him, 
“an original generative act equivalent to the statement ‘I was born.’”98 
 This example demonstrates the foundational structuring of blackness as a signifier for, 
what Foucault calls, “the art of maintaining life in pain,” which constitutes not only the subject 
upon which the pain is inflicted, but the witness as well.99 Foucault’s work elucidates how the 
spectacle juxtaposes “truth” and pain within a political field of reciprocal power relations of 
dominion and objection enacted through the body. The pain legislated through the spectacle 
confirmed the truth of, that is gave birth to, the objective ontological status of the captive body. 
“The scars left on the body [and] the spectacle that accompanies it,” Foucault explains, signifies 
the ontological objectivity of the subject.100 The marriage of pain to truth inextricably bound the 
ontological state of the captive body, as well as imaginations of black subjectivity, to a perpetual 
state of prolonged death represented through a life in pain.  
In this light, the spectacle is only not an embodied event; it is not the actual beating of 
Aunt Hester, or even the cries of her submission. Rather, in the words of Diana Taylor, the 
spectacle “…is that which we do not see, the invisible that ‘appears’ only through mediation.”101 
According to Guy Debord the spectacle is “not a collection of images, but a social relation 
among people, mediated by images.”102 The mediated images of the “terrible spectacle” are not 
only the images of the captive’s body, but the bodies of the spectator, as they stand to witness the 
spectacle in all its various forms; the spectacle interpellates all. The social relations animated by 
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the spectacle quiets black subjectivity, becoming visible by the spectacle’s dance with “scopic, 
political, [and] economic repertories”103 of the institution of North American slavery. Even as 
the spectacle comes to a natural end—in the exhausted arms of the slave-owner giving way to the 
back of the captive, in the final breathes of spectacle’s victim, in the complete (corporeal and/or 
psychic) dismemberment of the captive—the dance continues, as the trace of the spectacle is 
sketched within the bodies of all involved. Through this tracing, the spectacle does not, as 
Derrida announces, “stay in [its] place,”!instead functioning as a conjuring trick to establish the 
autonomy of a white subjectivity.104 Through the act of witnessing, blackness is articulated 
through the gaze of white subjectivity. This spirit beholds, gazes upon, and ultimately possesses 
the body at the center of the spectacle and resurrects a specter in its own image; the captive’s 
body becomes an “abstract and empty vessel,” a floating signifier, an artifactual repository, that 
is inhabited from the inside by blackness and the spectral character of objectivity and suffering 
which always already accompanies it because of its origin in spectacular suffering.  
This performative hauntology, one in which the bodies at the center of the spectacle are 
forced to enact the qualities of suffering and death, is elucidated through Hartman’s discussion of 
John Rankin and his attempts to deter his brother’s involvement in the North American trading 
of captive bodies. Rankin uses his body, through the human capacities inherent in the language 
of pain, to extend his humanity to the bodies of the enslaved. Despite the best of intentions, such 
a move, Hartman highlights, does serious damage to the ontological field of the captive’s 
body.105 In attempting to empathetically understand the pain/humanity of the enslaved, the 
spectator’s body moves from passive witness to, at the very least, an imaginative spectator. In 
this way, a phenomenal move, or a phenomenal slippage of sorts, is made where the space of the 
captive’s body is occupied by the experiential sensorium of the spectator. This phenomenal move 
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does two things:  first, through his empathetic appeal to “make their suffering our own” Rankin 
functionally obliterates the other by denying the sentience of the captive body.106 Rankin 
replaces the captive’s sensory experience of pain with his own thereby rendering invisible the 
autonomy of the slave’s pained humanity. Extending from this, the second effect of this 
phenomenal slippage of white humanity to the captive’s body is the reinforcement of the 
“thingly” quality of the enslaved, positioning “it” as a fungible commodity. The slave body 
becomes “an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of others’ feelings, ideas, 
desires, and values…”107 As an extension of this same point, the slave body as property becomes 
a simulation of the master’s desires; “the dispossessed body of the enslaved is the surrogate for 
the master’s body since it guarantees his disembodied universality and acts as the sign of his 
power and domination.”108 The spectacle’s ontologization through the slave’s body constructs 
blackness as a multi-faceted specter that corporealizes the affective ecologies of nonexistence, 
slow death, and external power and domination, hollowing the lived body and replacing the core 
of its ontology within these ecologies.  
Through this dis/possession of the lived body, the ecologies of nonexistence birthed the 
institution of slavery and, propagated by the institution’s spectacular enactments of pain are 
granted a phenomenal existence as they are resurrected in the racialized body of someone other. 
Localized within the body of the captive, the affective ecologies of prolonged death, pain, and 
powerlessness move from the spectacular to the quotidian. In this second phenomenal move, the 
specter begins to fashion the ontological status of the captive. Hartman marks the ontological 
shift of the captive body through, what she calls, “innocent amusements:” the dissipation of the 
terrors of slavery through quotidian performances of song, pleasure, and good cheer.109 Hartman 
understands the ontological position of the enslaved to be flattened not only by the pain of 
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spectacles of suffering, but also by the affective ecologies of prolonged death, pain, and external 
domination that manifest through the “dissimilation of suffering through spectacle[s]” of song, 
dance, “stepping it up lively,” or other forms of coerced pleasure.110 Through coerced 
performances of joviality, the scene of subjection moved from the auction block or whipping 
post, where the spectacle was an external force/event, to the body itself. Now inhabited from the 
inside by the aforementioned affective ecologies, the body of the captive became a visual 
signifier of the prolonged death enacted through the slavery’s spectacles of the pained body.  
The phenomenal experience of pain and the spectacular performance of the quotidian 
coalesced to establish a corporal language of blackness as an object ontologically bound to death 
and subjugation. Blackness is structured upon a performative hauntology of death, in which the 
captive’s body became a performative marker of not only the material, often spectacular, 
conditions of genealogical, social, and physical prolonged death, but the pained, immaterial 
conditions of phenomenal, imaginative, and performative non-existence as well. Nestled within 
these performances of the pleasure was an assumption of agency that assumes such performances 
are of the volition of the enslaved. As assumed authors of their own performative scripts, captive 
bodies read through the innocent amusements of slavery, became weapons against themselves, 
hiding the origin of the spirits of nonexistence. If the body contains performative capabilities of 
doing and undoing the self, then the spectacle acts as that which grounds blackness in the 
presence of its performance, as a docile and death-derived object—a spook—stripping away the 
agency of bodies of black facticity through the deeply felt, yet invisibly rendered, experiences of 
death and negation. Performative expression within the spectacle inscribes a social hierarchy 
through an illusion of direct testimony which stages the agency of the black body as a form of 
willed self-immolation, a “consented” state of the subjected self. It is the spectacle that spatially 
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and temporally orients the black body, and allows the specter of blackness to replace bodies of 
black facticity. This understanding of the production of the subject through seemingly self-
inflicted experiences of death is further explored by placing Hartman’s insights and the 
production of black subjectivity within a politics of morbidity as offered by Patrick Anderson’s 
and Foucault’s theorizations of subjectivation.  
Anderson theorizes a politics of morbidity to highlight the constitutive power of self-
starvation in the (de)formation of a subject. What I am interested in is his narration, through 
Foucault, of the “event of subjectivation: the production of political subjectivity in the context of 
subordination to larger institutional and ideological domains.”111 Here, Anderson articulates 
how, in the (inter)play between life and death, in “staging and sustaining the ultimate loss of the 
subject occasioned by death,” a body is infused with an agency that thwarts the political power 
exercised by regimes of domination.112 I argue that the black subject is formed through a politics 
of morbidity, what I call a performative hauntology of death, that rest within Hartman’s 
discussion of the performance of blackness as a tactic of resistance. Anderson’s articulation of a 
politics of morbidity demonstrates how physical erasure or disappearance induced by the 
spectacle can be embraced as an agent of performative becoming, thereby highlighting the 
dialectical relationship between visibility and invisibility. He begins with an understanding of 
morbidity as the “consciousness of the profoundly affective significance of one’s own 
mortality.”113 From this he outlines a politics of morbidity as “the embodied, interventional 
embrace of mortality and disappearance not as destructive, but as radically productive stagings of 
subject formations in which subjectivity and objecthood, presence and absence, life and death 
intertwine” (author’s emphasis).114 This more than articulates the condition of captivity, as the 
slave subject was continually faced with the “profoundly affective significance of one’s own 
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mortality,” or the constant presence of death Patterson spells out. 
 The omnipresence of death produced a particular subjectivity through ecologies of 
nonexistence, the black subject. However, through the embrace of objecthood, the subject 
became an agent in its event of subjectivation. This becoming materialized performatively and 
visually as blackness, an embrace of the precarious ontological positioning between life/death, 
absence/presence, subjectivity/objecthood—an embrace of death and negation. Blackness arose 
within ecologies of nonexistence and was subsequently appropriated as a tactic of resistance that 
voiced the pain(s) of the slave’s morbidity. Where Anderson considers the literal disappearance 
of the body, the eating away of one’s own flesh in the progression of emaciation, I consider the 
way in which captive bodies embraced their own disappearance caused by the specter of 
blackness, which, as Derrida reminds, conjures its own autonomy, but does so only by 
concealing our own. This is not a disappearance of the body, but a disappearance that occurs 
through the body’s socioaesthetic, political, and phenotypical orientation—a disappearance into 
the body.  
The spectacle’s move to the quotidian, however, ultimately allowed the enslaved to enact 
his/her agency through tactics of practice. The centrality of practice described as the “small-scale 
and everyday forms of resistance [that] interrupted, reelaborated, and defied the constraints of 
everyday life under slavery and exploited openings in the system for the use of the enslaved,” 
that allowed for a performative counter-investment in the body as a site of possibility.115 To 
highlight this, Hartman cites the narrative of John McAdams and his commentary on the 
“Saturday night dances” mandated by his master: “We made good use of these nights as that was 
all the time the slaves had to dance, talk, and have a good time among their own color.”116 This 
citation articulates the need to make “good use” of the artifice of the “pain-less” dance 
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atmosphere. This is but one demonstration of how this spectral and spectacular character of pain 
is infused within the epidermis of the slave. We see the ever-evolving dynamics of the slave’s 
pained flesh in McAdams’ pursuit of refuge from the barbarism of slavery in the time spent with 
“[his] own color.” For McAdams, the blanket of skin color was enough to shelter him from the 
daily atrocities of slavery. In this we see McAdams’, perhaps intentional, refusal to recognize the 
artifice of the dance by, perhaps intentionally, accepting the artifice of his own body. The 
performance of blackness, as a tactic of resistance and limited agency, plays a vital role in 
redressing the black body. McAdams’ simultaneous refusals are demonstrative of how the pained 
body is redressed in the collective enunciation of that pain, a performative gesticulation that 
transforms pleasurable domination into a politics that utilizes pleasure as an understandably 
insufficient form of redress. The performance of blackness became one such pleasurable 
performative gesticulation; it is through the insufficient forms of redress that blackness is 
embodied. 
The following chapter explores the inefficiencies of the corporal knowledge of blackness, 
articulating how the specters of nonexistence, which allowed the captive’s humanity to be 
consumed by a disembodied white universality, have continued to linger long after emancipation.  
Using Fanon’s psychoanalytic and phenomenal investigations in conjunction with Derrida 
theorizations of haunting, the chapter articulates blackness through the Foucauldian move from 
disciplinary technologies, characterized by the right to take life, toward expressions of 
biopolitical effects of power constituted by the disallowance of life to the point of death.117 
Where the spectacle once sought to organize black bodies within the confines of the plantation, 
upon emancipation the spectacle of pained humanity continued to limit the spatial orientation of 
black bodies as a means of societal protection. The spectacle achieves the protection of society 
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by performatively refiguring selfhood as a fetishized commodity, and denying the potential for 
re-signification. The biopolitical operation of the spectacle produces a black body that is 
disposable, in so far, as the value of the body is entangled in its ability to reproduce blackness—
to become a specter.   
The desire to reproduce blackness is recognized in Fanon’s declaration that precedes the 
often-quoted “Look! A Negro!” scene; Fanon declares, “I thought I was being asked to construct 
a physiological self, to balance space and localize sensations, when all the time they were 
clamoring for more.”118 Fanon’s acknowledgement demonstrates how the spectacle is housed 
within a biopolitical framework of maintaining a distance that keeps blackness near-enough to 
preserve difference. The sustained maintenance of difference, the ideology foundations of Jim 
Crow and lynching spectacles of the American South, are other iterations of the ecologies of 
slow death and domination that characterizes the specter of blackness. This biopolitical 
allowance of death signals the processes of signification that reifies blackness through continual 
confrontation with abjection. Chapter 3, then, interrogates the insufficiencies of blackness by 
articulating the inability of re-signification and the psychological consequences of the process of 
subjectivation through the affective ecologies of death.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE GRIEF OF A NEGRO’S HOME: THE FAILED MOUNRING OF 
BLACKNESS 
 
“Anything dead coming back to life hurts.” A truth for all times… 
 
Amy Denver, Beloved119  
 
Toni Morrison’s 1987 post-modern ghost story chronicles the untold memorialization of 
the hurt of resurrection. Beloved narrates the full weight of Amy Denver’s truth through an 
inspirited re-telling of the story of escaped-slave Margaret Garner. Forced to submit to the 
realities of life in death, in 1856, Garner slaughtered her eldest daughter instead of seeing her 
child “returned” to the institution of slavery under the provisions of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act. 
Set in the fictive landscape of Cincinnati, Ohio in 1873, in the midst of American 
Reconstruction, Morrison re-imagines the aftershock of Garner’s infanticide through the 
experience of Beloved’s protagonist, Sethe.120 Nearly twenty years after the killing of her 
unnamed child, Sethe and her only living daughter, Denver, continue to reside in not only in the 
memory of her nameless child, but in the space of the child’s execution as well. Articulating 
Patterson’s claim of the psychological control exerted upon the black body in excruciating detail, 
Morrison’s novel narrates not only the story of a home built upon the haunted solace of the past, 
but articulates the pains of life resurrected out of death—a testament affirmed in the words of 
Sethe’s mother-in-law, “Not a house in the country ain’t packed to its rafters with some dead 
Negro’s grief.”121  
Morrison’s novel, however, verbalizes more than just the story of Margaret Garner, or the 
experience of former slaves during American Reconstruction. “The book was not about the 
institution—Slavery with a capital S. It was about these anonymous people called slaves…” 
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Morrison explains. “When I say Beloved is not about slavery, I mean that the story is not slavery. 
The story is these people—these people who don’t know they’re in an era of historical interest. 
They just know they have to get through the day.”122 Beloved becomes an articulation of 
quotidian bodies roaming the liminal space between a life-in-death and a death-in-life, a life 
rooted in the knowledge that “anything dead coming back to life hurts.” Yet, nestled within this 
“truth for all times” are smaller truths that come to light through Morrison’s text, and ultimately 
become the driving force behind her post-modern slave narrative. Morrison’s novel locates the 
realms of life and death only to journey the porous line between the two. In doing so, she 
juxtaposes the narratives of life-in-death, as felt through the tremors of vengeful spirits, as well 
as narratives of death-in-life, experienced through the flesh of Sethe. These narratives collide 
with the introduction of a young woman with a history as opalescent as the waters in which she 
was conjured. Assuming the name Beloved, the single word placed on the tombstone of Sethe’s 
nameless child, this woman is eventually recognized as the physical manifestation of an invisible 
spirit; the dead resurrected into flesh.  
Morrison’s text documents how, in the aftermath of American slavery, the story of 
blackness is rooted in a simultaneous desire and necessity to learn to live in a home that is 
haunted with “some dead Negro’s grief.” Such a story, however, is not ignited until this deathly 
shadow is resurrected into flesh. The novel is a testament to how the ontological foundation of 
being requires the acute awareness of remembered presence as it coalesces with lived absence, 
constructing what Morrison calls, “rememory,” the experience of the circularity of time, space, 
and body, as past places and things are erected through the presence of one’s body/mind. Or, as 
put by Morrison’s protagonist,  
I was talking about time.  It’s so hard for me to believe in 
it. Some things go. Pass on. Some things just stay. I used to 
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think it was my rememory. You know. Some things you 
forget. Other things you never do. But it’s not. Places, 
places are still there. If a house burns down, it’s gone, 
but the place—the picture of it—stays, and not just in my 
rememory, but out there, in the world. What I remember is 
a picture floating around out there outside my head. I mean, 
even if I don’t think it, even if I die, the picture of what I 
did, or knew, or saw is still out there. Right in the 
place where it happened.123 
  
Twenty-five years after the publication of Beloved, and nearly 150 years after the end of the 
American Civil War and start of the American Reconstruction Era, this chapter theorizes a 
notion of blackness in/as haunting—a rememory of nonexistence and death that is continually  
(re)articulated through the presence of the black body. The chapter delves into the ontological 
positioning of black life as threaded through ecologies of nonexistence, as well as the 
pathological consequences of that phenomenal experience.  
Fanon’s poetic ruminations of the post-colonial black subject provide further insight into 
the corporeal/phenomenal implications of the hauntological constitution of blackness, as well as 
the neurosis that necessarily results. Fanon’s writings forward the notion of transcendental 
consciousness, a realm beyond ontological understandings of not only blackness, but the 
category of human.124 As such, Fanon makes an important distinction between ontology and 
existence, which he articulates in “The Lived Experience of the Black Man,” the translated title 
of his most cited work in Black Skin, White Masks. Fanon’s work is founded upon the premise: 
“Ontology does not allow us to understand the being of the black man, since its ignores the lived 
experience…”125 Just as Morrison text, Fanon’s work calls for the development of a hauntology 
of blackness to attest to the metaphysics of both presence and absence, accounting for notions of 
existence born from the affective excesses of loss, absence, and pained, prolonged death. An 
alternative to Richard Philcox’s translation perhaps conveys Fanon’s hauntological questioning 
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of blackness more clearly: “Ontology—once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by the 
wayside—does not permit us to understand the being of the black man.”126 Read through either 
translation, Fanon’s offers an understanding of black subjectivity as lacking “ontological 
resistance,” a psychoanalytic condition that produces the (black) self through mourning, or more 
accurately, the inability to mourn.127  
In Morrison’s text, this inability to mourn is translated into perversions of love, which is 
announced in the opening pages of the text when Denver, acknowledging the abandoned rage of 
the home’s spirit, remarks, “For a baby she throws a powerful spell,” to which Sethe adds, “No 
more powerful than the way I loved her…”128 In her explication of the stifling torment that clings 
to the space shared by the living and the deceased, Morrison makes clear that the baby’s 
unbridled wrath is birthed from the sacrifices of her mother’s love. “Counting on the stillness of 
her own soul,” Morrison writes, “she had forgotten the other one: the soul of her baby girl. Who 
would have thought that a little old baby could harbor so much rage? Rutting among the stones 
under the eyes of the engraver’s son was not enough. Not only did she have to live out her years 
in a house palsied by the baby’s fury at having its throat cut, but those ten minutes she spent 
pressed up against dawn-colored stone studded with star chips, her knees wide open as the grave, 
were longer than life, more alive, more pulsating than the baby blood that soaked her fingers like 
oil.”129 As the novel pushes forward, the manifestations of Sethe’s love is further dredged 
through her inability to mourn, causing her would-be lover, Paul D, to announce its 
overburdened mass; “Your love is too thick,” he affirms. To this, Sethe replies, “Love is or it 
ain’t. Thin love ain’t love at all.”130 What Morrison’s text demonstrates is how the multifarious, 
psychoanalytic translations of this failed mourning necessitates a return to the phenomenal 
negotiations of the black body as constituted within the chasm between the (black) self and the 
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world. This chapter proceeds by engaging the psychological translations of this inability to 
mourn as it manifests through the lived body.  
Blackness in/as Failed Mourning 
In her essay, provocatively mirroring the title of a Charles Mingus riff, “All the Things 
You Could Be Now, If Sigmund Freud’s Wife Was Your Mother,” Hortense J. Spillers explains 
that race, and blackness in particular, “is the perfect affliction, if by that we mean an undeniable 
setup that not only shapes one’s view of things but also demands an endless response.”131 
Conjoining Morrison’s imaginative inquiry with Fanon’s psychoanalytically-driven 
investigations, this chapter argues that the infliction of blackness manifests as a failed mourning, 
in which the ecologies of abjection and lack of ontological resistance that constitute the core of 
black subjectivity are endlessly announced through a politics of history that is inhered by bodies 
across a range of temporalities—an enunciation that demands response, but it is one that we are 
incapable of providing. My discussion of the subjectivizing process of blackness instigated 
through, what I theorize as a, failed mourning begins by: first, considering the constitution of the 
(black) self, then applying that discussion to Fanon’s work in Black skin/White Masks. In 
addressing the theoretical intercessions on the intersubjective constitution of race, this chapter 
articulates the process by which the black body is fashioned as both haunted and a haunting, 
returned always to itself “spread-eagle, disjointed, redone, [and] draped in mourning.”132  
During the University of Michigan’s “Tanner Lectures on Human Values” in 1988, less 
than a year after the publication of Beloved, Morrison delivered a lecture identifying the 
relationship between abjection and mourning, haunting, and blackness beyond the realm of 
fiction.  In it Morrison pinpoints “the unspeakable things unspoken,” the invisible yet 
unmistakable presence of Afro-Americans in American literature, what she calls “a search for the 
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ghost in the machine.”133 Morrison explains the impulse of mid-seventeenth century American 
authors who, at the height of abolitionist protests, incongruously produced texts almost 
exclusively within the genre of romance. Articulating this absence as a Derridain inflected 
haunting or nagging memory, she professed, “We can agree, I think, that invisible things are not 
necessarily ‘not-there’; that a void may be empty but not be a vacuum…certain absences are so 
stressed, so ornate, so planned, they call attention to themselves; arrest us with intentionality, and 
purpose…”134 Morrison’s lecture exorcises the ghosts that haunt the machine of American 
Literature, speaking into existence the overwhelming absences in the work of Hawthorne, 
Thoreau, Whitman and the litany of other “canonic” novelists of the time. Through Beloved, 
Morrison announces the unspeakable void at the core of the American Renaissance Period, 
asking “What intellectual feats had to be performed by the author or his critic to erase me from a 
society seething with my presence…?”135 Through an imaginative placing of her body within the 
societal framework of the American Renaissance, Morrison anticipates her nonexistence, 
subsequently structuring the psychoanalytic constitution of her (black) self through the 
anticipation of that affective absence. Extending from Morrison’s literary and imaginative 
theorizations of (black) nonexistence, I argue that the phenomenal construction of the black body 
leads to the psychological anticipation of nonexistence. As such, blackness operates as an object 
to be radically excluded from the body, even before its inclusion, thereby constantly hailing the 
self into subjectivity that precedes it. Specifically for racially marked bodies, this act of 
becoming originates in the absent presence of abjection at the core of one’s subjectivity, which 
manifests through an inconsolable mourning. Freud’s 1917 account of the pathological 
consequences of loss and/or death provides substantial insight into understanding blackness as a 
site of failed mourning.  
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Freud articulates mourning as the pained realities of loss, as the libido slowly withdraws 
from the absent object. Once “the ego succeed[s] in freeing its libido from the lost object” the 
work of mourning is accomplished.136 Successful mourning is contingent upon: 1) the 
recognition of loss, and 2) the passing of time necessary to restore one’s ego.137 Melancholia, 
contrarily, refuses both these stipulations, as it signifies the unconscious condition of the 
subject’s reality of loss. Freud clarifies, “The complex of melancholia behaves like an open 
wound, drawing to itself cathectic energies…from all directions, and emptying the ego until it is 
totally impoverished.”  Conditioned by melancholic inhibitions, Freud continues,  
…the patient is aware of the loss which has given rise to his 
melancholia, but only in the sense that he knows whom he has lost 
but not what he has lost in him. This would suggest that 
melancholia is in some way related to an object-loss which is 
withdrawn from consciousness, in contradiction to mourning, in 
which there is nothing about the loss that is unconscious. 
(emphasis his)138      
 
Morrison demonstrates the continual existence of these consumptive conditions of 
mourning within the social fabric of post-modernity. She does so through the simultaneous act of 
stitching together in order to recall—a re/membering of—the bodies constituted through an 
inconsolable absence of subjectivity. Morrison describes this mournful act of re/membrance 
through the repetitious beauty of jazz, which has “the ability to make you want [more], and 
remember the want. That is a part of what I want to put in my books. They will never fully 
satisfy—never fully.”139 Morrison’s novels “remember the want” of racially marked bodies 
seeking to fulfill the inconsolable absence of life that characterized their subjectivity. In 
remembering that want, her work narrates the impossibility of filling the void created through the 
traumatic history of collective negation, but in a way that that negation is not experienced, but 
anticipated. Morrison holds open the quasi-evacuated space of negated humanity to return to the 
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moments that hold us in arrest with intentionality and purpose; she holds open the moment of 
collapsed meaning, in which blackness is formed through the performative interplay between the 
facticity of black flesh and the anticipation of the presence of specters carrying the cargo of the 
dead. Her persistent return to states of affective arrest, in which black flesh is fashioned by an 
overwhelming (pre)consciousness of abject and negated humanity, interestingly positions her 
narrative on the borders between mourning and melancholia.  
As the pained recognition and memorialization of the “anonymous people called slaves,” 
Morrison’s text is a conscious recognition of the “who” that is lost. As the author has repeatedly 
admitted, Beloved explicitly targets an African-American demographic to function as a form of 
collective recognition of the economies of pain that have constituted the discursive and aesthetic 
formations of the black body, both during and in the aftermath of slavery. But in granting the 
“unspeakable things unspoken” an enunciative force, the author is keenly aware of the “what” 
that is lost as well. Morrison’s novel, as a return to the collapsed space of negated humanity, 
longs for the array of black subjectivities lost in the midst of slavery. Morrison’s novel 
demonstrates how blackness is constituted through a failed mourning, an object-loss that is made 
conscious through the phenomenality of the body, where the who and what are consciously 
recognized as lost. The psychoanalytic conditions of that loss, as compelled by the negated 
spatial orientation of the body, simultaneously constitute and exceed the body and for that reason 
can never be recovered. This is clearly demonstrated in Beloved, where the who and what of 
Sethe’s loss is not in question, as the baby’s spirit both constitute and exceed not only Sethe’s 
home, but her body as well.  
It is important to note that the failed mourning of blackness is distinguished from 
articulations of melancholia offered by Paul Gilroy. In Post-Colonial Melancholia, Gilroy builds 
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not upon the work of Freud, but Alexander and Magarete Mitscherlich, whose psychoanalytic 
understandings of melancholia is based upon a refusal to mourn loss (i.e. Great Britain’s refusal 
to mourn the loss of its empire), which in turn leads to the repetition of the affective conditions 
of that loss. Blackness, as constituted through a failed mourning, however, exceeds the act of 
repetition; it instead holds open the melancholic space of negated humanity in an effort to 
imagine subjectivity beyond the conditions of an emptied and impoverished ego. Through the 
acts of returning and holding open, the act of memorializing blackness “leave[s] an empty place, 
always, in memory of the hope—and this” Derrida explains, “is the very place of 
spectrality…”140   
This materialized effect of the corporeal knowledge of failed mourning has become 
known as, the black body; an embodied act of re/membering, akin to what Sam Durrant refers to 
a racial memory, which “passes itself as a memory of the body, a memory of the violence 
inflicted on the racially marked body, that is also a bodily memory, a memory that takes on a 
bodily form precisely because it exceeds both the individual’s and the community’s capacity for 
verbalization and mourning.”141 The black body is the materialization of failed mourning, a 
specter of blackness that, through the act of re/membering, performs the double move of 
ontologizing and localizing the affective moments of collapse, the (inter)play between death and 
life, within the phenomenality of the body. The failed mourning of blackness is uniquely 
re/membered within bodies of black facticity, which are thrust into a dynamic act of becoming as 
they are situated in a flattened ontological and performative relation with psychoanalytic 
conditions of loss, negation, and death.  And so, this hauntology proceeds by articulating 
blackness as a failed mourning, the recognition of the static affects of loss that, through the 
impossibility of recovery, re/members the melancholic inhibitions—the ecologies of 
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nonexistence, the inconsolable want—into a corporeal knowledge that is passed from generation 
to generation. Blackness as a failed mourning is about the absences genealogically recorded on 
the body, buried as deep in the biological disposition as it is in the psychoanalytic self, 
continually returning the body to a space of negated humanity. Within the flesh, there 
resurrected, are the thousands of specters of death and abjection so densely packed that the force 
of their reveal causes the body to implode upon it self, splitting the self into the multitude from 
which the specters emerged.  
Beloved elaborates the ways in which the body is imbued with, what Harvey Young 
describes as, a critical memory, what I would rename as, a critical anticipation, that “assists the 
process of identifying similarities—shared experiences and attributes of being and becoming—
among black folk not by presuming that black bodies have the same memories but by 
acknowledging that related histories create experiential overlap.”142 The related histories and 
re/memories Young speaks of are those once-lived experiences founded in the quasi-evacuated 
space of negated humanity and signified through an unrecoverable loss: black captivity, racial 
segregation, racial profiling, sexualized objectification, economic, social, and political 
discrimination, and many other forms of racial violence and state terror. What follows this 
historical experiential overlap, according to Young, is the phenomenal, that is to say corporeal, 
anticipation of those histories of affective loss. “When popular connotations [and histories] of 
blackness are mapped across or internalized within black people,” Young assets, “the result is the 
creation of the black body. This second body, an abstracted and imagined figure, shadows or 
doubles the real one. It is the black body and not a particular, flesh-and-blood body that is the 
target of a racializing projection.”143 The black body is the carnal form of the specters of 
blackness, carrying the affective anticipation and loss of negated humanity. It is, therefore, 
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through the phenomenal figure of the black body that individual bodies, in the aftermath of 
slavery, are thrust into the drama of becoming haunted from the inside.  
The inaugural moment of this becoming, according to Young, is characterized through an 
experience of misrecognition. Providing an example Young explains, “When a driver speeds past 
a pedestrian and yells ‘Nigger,’ she launches her epithet at an idea of the body, an instantiation 
of her understanding of blackness. The pedestrian, who has been hailed and experiences the 
violence of the address, which seems to erase her presence and transform her into something else 
(an idea held by another), becomes a casualty of misrecognition.”144 Concluding, Young asserts, 
“The shadow overwhelms the actual figure…blackness manages to become a fact through 
repeated deployment across a range of bodies, [and] encourages the (mis)recognition of 
individuated bodies (a body) as the black body.”145  
Young’s work provides a lucid example of the process by which blackness materializes 
through the localization and ontologization of the critical re/memories of nonexistence upon the 
body; it reveals how blackness operates as the anticipated confluence of the affective excesses of 
loss and the agential force of existence to become a specter—“the tangible intangibility of a 
proper body without flesh, but still the body of someone as someone other.”146 I challenge 
Young’s work, however, and argue that the act of becoming that personifies blackness is not 
characterized by misrecognition, but rather by the act that precedes misrecognition, an 
anticipation that materializes through the gaze itself. I argue that the example Young cites is not 
an experience of misrecognition, where the presence of the body is misread and replaced by the 
phenomenal figure of blackness. Instead, Young’s example demonstrates how the conditions of 
negated humanity have become indissociable from the body itself through its anticipation. The 
aforementioned experience is one of an anticipated negation, in which the psychoanalytic 
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conditions of loss are projected onto bodies themselves. The driver does not launch her epithet at 
an idea, but a body whose visuality grants the driver an initial agency to announce that body’s 
degraded state. (Mis)recognition implies that bodies of factic blackness have an ability to signify 
something other than the sociohistorical conditions of its emergence. The fact remains, however, 
that the black body is an object whose matter, the flesh-and-blood materiality of the body, 
anticipates a specific form, blackness—a phenomenal condition that forecloses possibilities of 
subjectivity. The black body, therefore, is not merely a shadow or double of the flesh-and-blood 
body because the gaze inherent to the collective failed mourning of blackness positions them as 
one and the same—one cannot become a casualty of misrecognition, for, as Morrison’s novel 
and Fanon’s narration delicately illustrates, the specter of blackness is an anticipated casualty, an 
unnamed victim who, through its putative relationship to abjection, is situated on the precipice 
between life and death.  
In its most unsophisticated terms, the notion of abjection is intended to signify meanings 
of extreme debasement, wretchedness, and ignominy. In 1982 Julia Kristeva, through her 
publication Powers of Horror: An Essay On Abjection, brings the term into conversation within 
theoretical circles by forwarding the notion of abjection as seminal to the configuration of the 
psychoanalytic and phenomenal self. She posits that the subject is formed by intense, affective 
relationships to the objects that it encounters. Certain objects are affectively charged with 
experiences of horror and revulsion, which in turn, instills fear and/or loathing within its 
relational subject. Thus, these objects are decidedly undesirable and come to be considered by 
the subject as abject, and therefore that which must be avoided or cast out from the body. Yet, 
the act of casting an object away from the body insufficiently articulates how abjection functions 
to form the self. Avoiding the abject is not encompassed solely by the subject’s avoidance of a 
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particular object, but more so the subject’s internal desire to avoid the negative affective charge 
produced by the encounter, thus creating a distinct psychological border between the “I” of the 
self and the “otherness” of the object.147  
Joan Copjec further elucidates the tie between abjection and affect in May ’68: The 
Emotional Month. Copjec articulates affect as that which makes strange: “Affect does not 
familiarize, domesticate, or subjectivize…on the contrary, it estranges.”148  Affect has the ability 
to interrupt the relationship between a subject and object by removing what Lacan once called 
the “belong-to-me-aspect.”149 This belonging-together once served as the glue to the object-
subject relationship, but is now, through the movement of affective, exposed as artifice. 
Subsequently, the subject is moved to re-signify her/his subject position. In this way, affect can 
be understood as the resonance of a movement that pushes an individual toward the act of 
signification. Copjec highlights affect’s intrinsic relationship to signification by forwarding it as 
a movement of thought. “Affect inhabits passage” Copjec explains, “an excess of activity over 
each successive step constitutes the momentum of walking.”150 Affect continually forces the 
individual to walk the plank toward subjecthood until it eventually dives headfirst into a sea of 
its own desires, that is, its own subjectivity. Such a plunge, however, often happens with 
considerable hesitation: “It sometimes happens that thinking does grind to a halt, stop moving, 
becomes inhibited…When this happens, affect is know by a more specific name; it is called 
anxiety.” Copjec continues, “According to one of Freud's formulations, anxiety occurs when 
what was repressed and should have remained hidden becomes visible. We are now able to 
revise this. What erupts into awareness in moments of anxiety is not something that was formerly 
repressed (since affect never is), but the disjunction that defines displacement, which suddenly 
impresses itself as a gap or break in perception.”151 It is this type of affect, anxiety, which 
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characterizes abjection. When a subject is estranged from a particular relationship with an object, 
that is, when a subject experiences a gap or break in their perceived phenomenal relationship 
with an object, an anxiety is produced. This anxiety arises from the exposure of artifice; the 
border between the body and the object is at once constructed and blurred so that it may be 
reified to constitute a more definitive self. 
Kristeva holds that abjection “settles [the subject] within the fragile texture of a desire for 
meaning, which…makes [the subject] ceaselessly and infinitely homologous to it, what is abject, 
on the contrary, the jettisoned object, is radically excluded and draws [the subject] toward the 
place where meaning collapses.”152 I read Kristeva’s “fragile texture” as the fragility of the 
body’s phenomenal experience, desirous to acquire knowledge through its perception. The body 
learns, and performs its knowledge, ceaselessly, always moving to define its corporeality as 
distinct from what our perception reveals as abject. This definition can only happen in moments 
of “collapsed meanings” where the subject is moved to convulsion and therefore compelled to 
(re)signify the border between the body and the abject. In this respect, the abject and the self are 
inverted reflections of the other—mirrored—as the self is constituted through abjection.  
Morrison’s text holds open these stagnant moments of affective collapse where the body 
is literally thrown into convulsion in an effort to (re)signify its borders. This view of abjection, 
from a phenomenological perspective, leads to a deep consideration of the collective intentional 
arc of the black body, where it is understood as an abject object whose “matter,” the flesh-and-
blood body or the material facticity of the body, through historical series of collapsed moments is 
continually resignified as a specific “form,” blackness. Offering a succinct explanation of the 
relationship between abjection and the black body, literary theorist Darieck Scott claims 
“…abjection is a way of describing an experience, an inherited (psychically introjected) 
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historical legacy, and a social condition defined and underlined by a defeat.”153 I engage the 
works of Morrison and Fanon to articulate how encounters with blackness, because of the weight 
of its psychically introjected, abject historical capital, acts as a moment of collapsed meaning 
that affectively moves both racially marked and “unmarked” bodies to signify a psychological 
and, through a phenomenal extension of that psychosis, a corporeal boundary between itself and 
the blackness it has encountered. 
 I push this understanding forward, however, arguing that blackness operates as an 
anticipation of abjection, what I understand as a failed mourning. Blackness is produced through 
an event of subjectivation that anticipates socioaesthetic and biopolitical attempts to conjoin the 
matter of black bodies with forms of abjection. In light of this, the chapter asks: How does the 
anticipation of abjection lead to a pathological inability to jettison the abject because of its non-
present presence? How does this lead to an understating of, as Fanon asserts, “the image of one’s 
body [as] solely negating” making the body an image in the ‘third person?’”154  
Fanon’s Specter and the Gaze of Mourning    
In chronicling the hurt of resurrection, as well as the abundance of life it spurs, Morrison 
dramatizes the failed mourning of blackness, documenting the performative materializations of 
the specter of blackness, and outlining its ghostly presence ingrained in abject histories of 
economic, sociopolitical, and socioaesthetic conditions in the United States. Cultivating an 
intimate, performative relationship with particular bodies, the specters of death achieve 
phenomenal existence through the possession of the body it haunts; blackness assumes a 
corporeal form—the word, once again, becomes flesh. This section of the chapter continues its 
theorizations on how the specter of blackness, as conjured through a process of failed mourning, 
conjoins the affective excesses of loss with the agential force of phenomenality to exert a 
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powerful force over all bodies within its magnetic field. Extending from the second chapter’s 
discussion of mourning as more than a construction of presence, but a carrier of an interpellative 
gaze that ontologizes and localizes the dead’s presence, I ask: What are the consequences of a 
failed mourning of blackness, if its gaze is turned toward one’s own body? Further, what are the 
corporeal and pathological consequences of localizing the dead in one’s own body? This chapter 
addresses how blackness is constructed through the material trace of not only physical death, but 
the ecologies of negated humanity as an affective moment of collapse that is, as Morrison’s 
novel highlights, imperceptibly sedimented into the bodies of those who remain.  
Fanon’s introduction to Black Skin, White Masks mirrors Morrison’s text by analogizing 
the spatial and temporal orientation that saturates black subjectivity through the mourning of 
one’s lost subjecthood, as well as the affective disorders arising out of the ecologies abjection 
and negated humanity. “Blacks are men who are black,” Fanon rehearses, “in other words, owing 
to a series of affective disorders they have settled into a universe from which we have to 
extricate them…We are aiming at nothing less than to liberate the black man from himself.”155 
The recital of Fanon’s experience of these affective disorders is articulated through his poetic 
narration in “The Lived Experience of the Black Man,” the correctly translated title of Black 
Skin, White Mask’s fifth chapter. Fanon narrates the interminable cycle of signification that 
begins and ends at the black facticity of the body.  
Fanon, like Morrison, and Shakespeare before her, substantiates ontology through 
theorizations of haunting. And so Fanon’s recitation of the subjectivating event of blackness 
begins in a state of failed mourning. Fanon confesses, “I came into this world anxious to uncover 
the meaning of things, my soul desirous to be at the origin of the world, and here I am an object 
among other objects.”156 Fanon’s Merleau-Ponty inspired approach to bodily experience 
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intimates that this origin is his body, the starting point for his relation to the world. Fanon’s prose 
driven elaboration further reveals his inability to dwell in his body.157 The space of “shared 
inhabitance” between the world and Fanon’s body does not produce a sense of orientation, but 
the act of reconfiguration produces a sense of negation—“In the white world, the man of color 
encounters difficulties in elaborating his body schema. The image of one’s body is solely 
negating.”158 Read through the affective disorders produced through a sense of failed mourning 
the black body is locked within phenomenality, that is to say, it is bound to the transfiguration of 
the histories of nonexistence into the visual manifestation of blackness. Beloved demonstrated 
the force of this union. In Fanon’s text this union is observed and articulated through the live 
experience that “…not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the 
white man.”159 The agency of the black body to participate within a regime of (visual) reciprocity 
with the world is negated, restricting bodies of black facticity within the temporally oriented 
realm of blackness-as-form, a space of spectrality that continually returns the black body to the 
affective collapse of mourning, which localizes the sociohistorical realities of nonexistence and 
abjection within the flesh.  
The localization of the specter is exemplified in Fanon’s frequently quoted “Look! A 
Negro!” anecdote; the bodily histories that have been repressed emerge in the young child’s 
utterance. It is a moment of rupture that results in an anxiety, which, for Fanon produces the 
sensations of attack and collapse, his body ultimately giving way to a historicized epidermal 
schema. “Disoriented, incapable of confronting the Other, the white man, who had no scruples 
about imprisoning me, I transported myself on that particular day far, very far, from myself, and 
gave myself up as an object.”160 Fanon’s encounter with the abject leads to a break in perception, 
marking the distance between himself (his matter) and his self (his form). And just as Paul D 
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submits to the overwhelming impulses of his body, Fanon is thrown into a spitting, tensing, 
sweating, aching, vomiting, trembling convulsion that causes “a hemorrhage that left congealed 
black blood all over [his] body.”161 In this continual moment of arrest/collapse, Fanon is unable 
to locate his agency, bonding with abjection through the unspeakable act of mourning.  
For Fanon, the failed mourning of blackness materializes as an inability to surpass the 
symbiotic forces of negation and self-consciousness, a liberation unachieved due to a failure to 
descend into, what he calls, a “zone of nonbeing, an extraordinary sterile and arid region, an 
incline stripped bare of every essential from which a genuine new departure can emerge.”162 This 
zone marks a space where one’s humanity is constructed neither on the basis of negation nor 
self-consciousness, but is an arid region beyond signification. Because black bodies are caught 
within the cycle of signification that inscribes history upon the body, they are continually 
subjected to moments of affective collapse, yet lack the ability to descend into the zone of 
nonbeing, to engage a “genuine new departure” that (re)signifies the borders between the abject 
and the self. Because of this inability, the black body is no longer a mirror reflection of abjection, 
but signifies abjection itself. Blackness is articulated through a constant state of failed mourning 
that materializes through continual breach.  Bodies that experience the condition of being black 
engage their subjectivity through the “spitting, swearing, moaning, tensing, sweating, aching, 
vomiting” of encountering their own bodies as blackness-as-object/blackness-as-abject. A breach 
that Fanon, through repeated acknowledgement, learns to anticipate: 
The body is surrounded by an atmosphere of certain uncertainty. I 
know that if I want to smoke, I shall have to reach out my right 
arm and take the pack of cigarettes lying at the other end of the 
table. The matches, however, are in the drawer on the left, and I 
shall have to lean back slightly. And all these movements are made 
not out of habit but out of implicit knowledge. A slow composition 
of my self as a body in the middle of a spatial and temporal 
world—such seems to be the schema. It does not impose itself on 
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me; it is, rather, a definitive because it creates a real dialectic 
between my body and the world.163  
 
I move slowly in the world, accustomed now to seek no longer for 
upheaval. I progress by crawling. And already I am being dissected 
under white eyes, the only real eyes. I am fixed.164 
 
Interpreting Fanon’s narrative through the lens of hauntology, we understand that this 
ontological anticipation is instigated through the gaze inherent to mourning. This is made evident 
in Fanon’s attempt to overcome the ecologies of nonexistence by seeking reciprocity in the gaze 
of the Other. He writes, “Locked in this suffocating reification, I appealed to the Other so that his 
liberating gaze, gliding over my body…would give me back the lightness of being I thought I 
had lost, and taking me out of the world put me back in the world.”165 The inconsolable want at 
the core of black subjectivity is conveyed in Fanon’s plea to be taken out of the cyclical space of 
static abjection and returned to the zone of non-being, an ever-reaching space of phenomenal 
ambiguity. Hoping to overcome the “suffocating reification,” the continual moment of arrest in 
which his black flesh is constantly overwhelmed by specters of negation, Fanon turns toward the 
gaze of the Other to restore his “lightness of being,” and set his ontological drama in motion.  
The gaze of the specter, first, marks Fanon’s body as witness; his body has been 
collapsed by temporality and ontology. As discussed in the previous chapter, the act of furtive 
looking performed by the specter interpellates its witness into: 1) the body in the present that has 
yet to look, 2) the future body that will look, and 3) the past body that has been looked at. 
Locked within a cycle of failed mourning, Fanon’s body is positioned as the body in the present 
the has yet to look; the desire to escape the suffocating moment of arrest by appealing to the gaze 
of the Other positions his body as that which must look; and the negation of the Other’s gaze 
positions his body as looked at by the specter of blackness long before Fanon’s act of recognition 
occurs. This tripling effect of blackness is encapsulated in his text: “And then we were given the 
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occasion to confront the white gaze. An unusual weight descended on us. The real world robbed 
us of our share. In the white world, the man of color encounters difficulties in elaborating his 
body schema. The image of one’s body is solely negation. It’s an image in the third person.”166 
Through Fanon’s narrative we understand that the process by which bodies of black facticity 
engage the event of subjectivation is characterized by a submission to the tripling effect induced 
by the specter of blackness—the ghosted constitution of the self through a failed mourning, 
which manifests not only as being haunted but also as a haunting.  
In this way, the black body has the ability to occupy the space of spectrality, demarcated 
by the line between the abject and normalized. The black body functionally serves as the spectral, 
armored gatekeeper of abjection. As Derrida reminds, King Hamlet’s armor “may be but the 
body of a real artifact, a kind of technical prosthesis, a body foreign to the spectral body that it 
dresses, dissimulates, and protects, masking even its identity.”167 The production of the black 
body, which acts as the specter’s “technical prosthesis,” preserves the identity of the specter. The 
specter’s armor, the black body, constructs an asymmetrical relationship with its witness, 
granting the specter an ability to “see without being seen, but to speak in order to be heard” that 
denies the reciprocity of its witness.168 This asymmetrical relationship characterizes the young 
boy’s reaction to Fanon’s body. The young boy’s fear of being eaten by the Negro is not a fear of 
literal consumption, but rather a fear of being interpellated into the space of spectrality, the very 
abjection the boy is attempting to avoid. The young child, for the first time, recognizes through 
this moment of arrest, that he too is positioned on the precarious abyss of abjection; he is 
recognizing how his self is constituted through the ghostly anticipation of abjection signified 
through the black body. The specter has drawn the child to the precarious borders of being. The 
sociopolitical and socioaesthetic ecologies of nonexistence, upon which the presence of the 
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specter is constructed, work to preserve these vocabularies. In so doing, the phenomenal reach of 
the specter is extended and the asymmetrical relationship experienced by bodies of black 
facticity, as witnesses of the specters inherent to their phenomenal existence, is preserved.  
The specter’s ability to see without being seen maintains the hallucination of its 
autonomy by manipulating the visuality of black facticity. This is demonstrated in Fanon’s 
attempt at ontological restoration, which fails in the face of the phlegmatic gaze of the Other. 
“Fixed” within the visual hallucination of the specter, Fanon enters a state of negation so tense 
that he, like Hamlet, is catapulted into a frenzy that requires a (re)signification of his ontological 
borders. Hamlet’s return of the specter’s gaze forced him, for the first time, to consider the 
ontology of being and nonbeing. This moment of ontological reconsideration for Fanon, 
contrarily, turns the gaze inward to mark the recognition of his body in a predisposed state of 
possession. Fanon witnesses the presence of the specter of blackness within the gaze of the 
Other: “I see in this white gaze” Fanon states, “that it’s the arrival is not of a new man, but of a 
new type of man, a new species. A Negro, in fact!” Fanon’s articulation of the becoming of a 
Negro marks a body whose materiality anticipates the arrival of the affective ecologies of 
nonexistence. Through this anticipation the citational link between the ecologies of nonexistence 
and its origin within slavery’s culture of death disappears within Fanon’s body, just as the 
affective resonance of Beloved disappears in the body of Sethe. The confluence of 
phenomenality and spectrality is Fanon’s body, which provokes the hallucination of the 
autonomy of blackness; the Negro becomes through the disappearance of the specter’s origin that 
is inherent to the body’s appearance—“I am overdetermined from the outside, I am a slave not to 
the ‘idea’ others have of me, but to my appearance. I arrive slowly in the world; sudden 
emergences are no longer my habit. I crawl along. The white gaze, the only valid one, it is 
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already dissecting me. I am fixed.”169 Fanon is articulating the state of being haunted, which 
Derrida suggests as a state of being overwhelmed with a sense of obsession, being a constant 
fear, a fixed idea, or the lingering resonance of a nagging memory.170  
 This nagging resonance is announced through the affective anxiety of the young child. 
An additional return to Derrida’s theorizations of haunting explains that the specter possesses not 
only the ability to see without being seen, but to speak in order to be heard. The child’s utterance 
is, as Derrida writes, a falling back of the voice of the unseen law-maker, that is to say the visual 
and aural realities of the ecologies of death and nonexistence, that stands before him. The specter 
assumes another carnal form through the possession of the young child. The child’s blind 
submission, marked by his utterance, signals the aural manipulation of the specter as it uses the 
sonic and affective registers of the body to confirm its autonomy. 
However, bodies blackened through the act of possession, that is to say bodies inhabited 
by the specter of blackness, have the potential to expose its artifice as a “technical prosthesis” by 
blurring the line between the abject and the non-abject. Bodies of a black facticity uniquely 
positioned as the haunted and the haunting, possess the ability to make strange the notion of 
blackness itself. Specifically within the United States this unnerving performance materializes 
through the deconstruction of the falsely dichotomous vocabularies of whiteness and blackness. 
The following chapter explores the performative potential of this capability by exploring the 
voice of blackness, and ludic possibilities therein.      
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CHAPTER 4: DESCEND: TO FALL INTO THE SPECTER’S VOICE  
 
Invisibility, let me explain, gives one a slightly different sense of time, you're never quite on the 
beat. Sometimes you're ahead and sometimes behind. Instead of the swift and imperceptible 
flowing of time, you are aware of its nodes, those points where time stands still or from which it 
leaps ahead. And you slip into the breaks 
and look around. That's what you hear vaguely in Louis' music. 
 
Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man171 
 
 
I feel in myself a soul as immense as the world, truly  
a soul as deep as the deepest of rivers, my chest has the power to expand  
without limit. I am a master  
and I am advised to adopt the humility of the cripple. 
Yesterday, awakening to the world,  
I saw the sky turn upon itself utterly and wholly.  
I wanted to rise, but the disemboweled silence  
fell back upon me, its wings 
paralyzed. Without responsibility, straddling 
 Nothingness and Infinity, 
 I began to weep. 
 
Frantz Fanon, Black Skin/White Masks172   
 
It is a familiar scene. Lost somewhere amidst a miasma of reefer smoke and the even 
more intoxicating heat of Louis Armstrong’s trumpet, he waits in a lyrical break, possessed by 
the sounds of an underworld as dark as it is majestic. Descending far beyond the River Styx, 
where the iridescent silhouettes of ghosts long forgotten softly drown, he arrives at the 
netherworld’s melancholic heart; it beats with the tempo of his origin story—“In the beginning 
there was blackness…Black is…and black ain’t…black will make you, or black will unmake 
you.”173 The novel’s nameless protagonist, overcome by the dissonant sounds of blackness, 
retreats from the cadence of Louis’ horn to find what remains of himself still in the damp void of 
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a Manhattan basement. As he ascends from this “underworld of sound,” with him emerges the 
suffocating echo of the underworld’s cry: “What Did I Do to Be So Black and Blue?” Unable to 
address the complexities of this call, this son of invisibility pulls his past into the present to 
narrate his tragic romance with impermanence. Ralph Ellison, by way of his invisible man, 
narrates the ontological problem of a black (and blue) existence, delicately unfolding the politics 
and poetics of (in)visibility to reveal the process by which the affective ecologies of abjection 
and negation speak through, and beyond, the aesthetic regimes of blackness.  
In this way, Ellison’s text operates as an imaginative conservatory for Fanon’s 
theorizations. When placed in conversation, these texts offer a productive interpretation of 
Orlando Patterson’s claim that power is exercised upon the black body through the sustained 
control of its cultural modes of production. This sustained control, I argue, is demonstrated in the 
specter’s ability, through the aural dimensions of its presence, to conjure its own autonomy by 
concealing that of the body it possesses. Fanon’s narrative illuminates the anticipation of the 
specter, and the subsequent grafting of the affective ecologies of death into an epidermal script 
that inhabits the insides of the black body to construct it as overdetermined from the outside. In 
this atmosphere of upturned skies—a time out of joint—the disemboweled silence is heard and 
the depths of ontology are revealed to the witness who rapidly approaches the possibility of 
descent into one’s own essentia. Paralleling Hamlet’s incessant downward spiral, Fanon and 
Ellison’s protagonist are positioned in the liminality between Infinity and Nothingness: a 
collapsed moment of disjointed temporality constructed through the announced presence of the 
specter, and experienced through the tripling of the self. Unlike the Prince of Denmark, who, 
despite his paralyzing inaction, ultimately falls forward into an ontological abyss, Fanon’s 
phenomenally black body restricts his psychoanalytic self from leaping into the depths of this 
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zone of nonbeing. Ellison, however, pens into existence that which his contemporary cannot, 
imaginatively sketching the fall into this ontological abyss. This affective collapse of time and 
the descent made possible through the specter’s aurality is rendered through the poetic musicality 
of Armstrong’s horn, which grants the musician the uncanny ability to “make poetry out of being 
invisible.”174 Through this descent, the potentialities of being, what Ellison calls, “The Blackness 
of Blackness,” is revealed.  
I follow Ellison and Derrida, Fanon and Shakespeare into the subterranean nadirs of 
black hauntology. Occupying the point of convergence between these texts, this chapter argues 
that the aural dimensions of the specter of blackness materializes through an affective stagnation, 
a collapsed moment resulting in a deep sense of failed mourning, which breaks or disjoints time. 
However, the mobilization of the aural and affective registers of the body, which are constructed 
in the socioaesthetic and biopolitical relation between blackness and abjection, announce the 
performative potentialities contained within this moment of collapsed temporality; the voice of 
the specter creates the conditions of possibility for descent into the arid region beyond the 
ontological. Therefore, this chapter will first sketch the conditions of affective stagnation that 
produce the black body as an immovable object within fields of signification. Then discussing 
how this simultaneous collapse of temporality and visuality provokes an ontological descent that 
is both precarious and promising. 
The Stillness of Sound: Visuality, Aurality, and Blackness  
Ellison’s inspired fiction dramatizes the phenomenal experience and psychological 
consequence of journeying through the world, unseen. His narrative interrogates spectrality, the 
porous divide between the material and the ethereal that the black body, through its ontological 
fungibility, is able to traverse. Through this investigation, Ellison reveals how the visuality of 
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blackness encompasses a host of sensations and histories, articulating the ways in which 
historical discourses work in concert with the entirety of our sensorium to construct the 
ontological locus of a subject that is identified within a field of vision. Advancing the 
hauntological theorization of Specters and Spooks, I argue that the ontologization of blackness 
solely through visual regimes constructs a subject that disappears through its appearance. 
Describing this disappearance as an inconsolable want at the core of his subjectivity, or, as 
Fanon might suggest, the pathological manifestation of his body as a solely negating image—as 
invisible—Ellison confesses, “You ache with the need to convince yourself that you do exist in 
the real world, that you’re a part of all the sound and anguish, and you strike out with your fist, 
you curse and swear to make them recognize you. And alas, it’s seldom successful.”175 
 Ellison’s confession articulates the phenomenal experience of blackness as conceived 
through affective registers of the aural and the haptic. This is echoed in Nicole Fleetwood’s 
monograph, Troubling Vision: Performance, Visuality, and Blackness, in which she argues that 
the black body exceeds visual perception; rather it is a multisensory experience of synesthesia, 
the condition in which the experience of a sensation automatically and involuntarily leads the 
sensory experience of another. This is described through yet another confession, that of Jesse 
Jackson Jr., who admits being afraid after hearing footsteps behind him late at night and being 
relieved when he turned to see a white man. This example demonstrates how the historical 
discourses of blackness are transfigured through aural registers that involuntarily and 
automatically trigger the sight of the black body. This fear is only relieved when the sight of 
blackness dissipates in the presence of whitness.   
With this theoretical foundation, Fleetwood argues for the fluidity of blackness as that 
which is not indelibly inked onto bodies or objects, but circulates: “Blackness fills in space 
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between matter, between object and subject, between bodies, between looking and being looked 
upon. It fills the void and is the void. Through its circulation,” she continues, “blackness attaches 
to bodies and narratives coded as such but it always exceeds these attachments.”176 The black 
body is a particular object that, because of its move from signifier to sign, “gives itself,” in the 
language of phenomenology, in a way that is more than what is gazed upon, that is it carries a 
corporeal surplus, a meaning that escapes the boundaries of the sign. Blackness runneth over; it 
eludes signification with an excess of meaning that constantly signals the absence that is lost in 
the flesh of the body.  
However, the affective surplus of blackness, explicitly during the Reconstruction Era, 
was harnessed and converted into a self-regulatory scene of subjection by limiting the excessive 
meaning of its visual signification. As a result, the black body lacked “movement within a field 
of signification” resulting in a “powerful stillness.”177 As a “unified” sign, subjected to this 
“powerful stillness,” the image of the black body became the authoritative source of blackness, 
and the excesses beyond the image—the referent to an absence it never held—were repressed. 
Attempts to recover the absence that was never there, the Nothingness Fanon eludes to, led to the 
condition of mourning that could never be redressed. Hartman acknowledges those conditions of 
mourning that resulted from the delimitation of black visuality: 
The abolition of slavery presumably announced the end of 
subjugation based on race or servitude, that the ascendancy of 
formal race—that is, immutable, inherent, and naturalized racial 
differences—perpetuated the “stigma of inferiority based on 
race…” While the freed would no longer “feel the disheartening 
influences of belonging to a subjugated race,” it was expected that 
they would “have to struggle under the difficulties and 
embarrassments arising out of recent slavery, or connected with a 
social repugnance founded principally on physical traits…” 
Certainly the “repugnance of the physical” denotes the abjection of 
blackness and the ambivalent character of the abject exemplified 
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by the conflicted and uncertain incorporation of black citizens into 
the national body…178 
 
The post-Emancipation sociopolitical and discursive formations of blackness were articulated 
through a “repugnance of the physical,” as well as a social repugnance, that functionally 
prohibited the fluidity and the excess of blackness by arresting and capturing the image of the 
black body within the narrative scripts of potential citizenship. As such, blackness as an abject 
form needed to be expunged through methods of biopolitical “quarantine,” which forced the 
aesthetic interpretation, articulation, and performance of blackness within a flattened 
epistemological visuality. Because of the flattened visuality, “the complexity of black lived 
experience and discourses of race are effaced.”179 The bodies of black facticity that lived beyond 
the sign of blackness, that is, beyond the black iconicity of ideal citizenship represented in the 
image of the black body, were politically, socially, economically, or physically effaced. 
This is the milieu in which Du Bois is situated. His rhetoric operates within a field of 
signification and vision that consistently produces with the image/sign of the black body and the 
signification of blackness it authenticates. The question that grounds his work is the same 
question at the fore of Fleetwood’s theorization of blackness and visuality: “How does it feel to 
be a problem?”180 Rearticulated in the words of Fleetwood, “…the black body is always 
problematic in the field of vision because of the discourses of captivity and capitalism that frame 
this body as such.”181 Du Bois, Fleetwood, and the multitude of bodies marked as black are 
forced to reckon with the specters that trouble their presence. This encounter between the 
phenomenal presence of the body and the spectral weight by which it is constituted is explicated 
through Du Bois’ often-quoted passage in the opening pages of Souls.182 Positioning the Negro 
in a field of vision, Du Bois explains the constitution of the black body through the act of 
looking, whether it be through the gaze of a viewer from the “other world” or the act of “looking 
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at one’s self through the eyes of the other.”183 Du Bois’ theory of double-consciousness 
recognizes the spectral trace of blackness, as well as the acknowledgement of a second-sight 
used to observe the temporized signification of blackness within a particular moment of affective 
collapse. Du bois’ work, then, attempts to challenge the nature of that signification in hopes of 
recouping the repressed excesses of blackness. 
To do this, Du Bois turns to aesthetics and ultimately performance to develop the trope of 
the New Negro as the central figure in re-visioning the signification of the black body. As Eric 
King Watts argues, “We must treat the New Negro as a kind of ‘artifice.’ We must attend to the 
productive forces captured in black artistic practices making emergent forms of black visuality 
and sensibility…”184 Du Bois’ employment of aesthetics attempted to harness the “productive 
forces” responsible for the emergence of one artifactual body, the black body, in order to replace 
it with another, the New Negro. Du Bois’ initial hope was that this new signification would 
ultimately unchain material black bodies from its abject form through political, aesthetic, social 
extension. As he put it, “the ideal of human brotherhood, gained through the unifying ideal of 
Race; the ideal of fostering and developing the traits and talents of the Negro, not in opposition 
to or contempt for other races, but rather in large conformity to the greater ideals of the 
American Republic…”185 For Du Bois, this political unity does not reside within this new 
subjectivity of blackness, nor in the aesthetic practices that structured it, but rather it is a 
production of the affective resonances those aesthetic practices and new subjects announce. The 
affective resonance of the New Negro is understood, first, through its epistemological disruption 
of blackness as signified through the black body; and, second, through its desire to be signified, 
to quite simply “make sense,” not only within visual but discursive fields as well.  
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Du Bois operates within the regimes of what Watts has identified as voice; “a 
phenomenon that is brought to life through artistic and aesthetic practices that move audiences 
into a sensual relationship with discourse, impelling a public acknowledgment of the affective 
and ethical dimensions of speech.”186 I understand voice to be the enuciative force that exposes 
the relationality between one’s experience of one’s own body, the discourse(s) that condition that 
body, and the world in which that body is placed. The unasked query that structures Souls is not 
asked through speech, but heard through voice. Voice is fluid, cresting at particular historical 
nodes and through particular aesthetic practices and dispersing at the very moment of its 
enunciation.  Du Bois’ work became an integral component of the New Negro movement, as a 
manifestation of voice was used to rearticulate the hyper-phenomenal experience of the black 
body.  
Fleetwood’s investigation is an attempt to understand how voice continues to circulate 
within the visual field of blackness, exploring the “affective power of black cultural production 
or the calling upon the spectator to do certain work…”187 Fleetwood’s work, as is Du Bois’, is 
founded upon the assumed privileged position of the spectator that calls upon the viewer “…to 
do certain work, to perform a function as arbiter, or decoder, of the visual signs that become 
aligned with blackness.”188 Du Bois and Fleetwood harken toward the excess and absence that 
lingers behind the image of the black body. But instead of occupying the zone in which that 
excess/absence “exists,” they pull the excess into the field of signification in order to reconstitute 
the sign of blackness.  
This, I believe, is a necessary exercise, as it does expand the realm of possibility of 
knowing blackness, that is, the epistemological understanding of blackness.189 However, if this is 
the only action taken, the war of signification wages on within a closed hermeneutical circuit; the 
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object of sight, the black body, has little control over its arbitration or decoding, as that 
autonomy is given over to the viewer whose gaze acts as a tool of negation. Or to use Du Bois’ 
terminology, the black body can only know the image from “the other world.” Both Daphne 
Brooks and Hartman demonstrates this through a discussion of minstrel performance, which was 
used as a vehicle of white epistemological exploration. The harnessing and control of the 
corporeal excess of blackness becomes the foundational theatrics of minstrel performance. Here, 
the excessive meanings of blackness were (re)possessed and replaced with yet another singular 
semantic container, which ironically (re)presented blackness as a fetishized spectacle of 
excessive buffoonery, sexual promiscuity, and all out pandemonium. Minstrel performance, yet 
again, nullified the excesses of the signifier of blackness, in an effort to claim a sense of 
explorative mobility for whiteness, its semantic doppelganger. With this logic, the black body 
can claim the grotesque excess of marginalization, but not by operating outside the limits of 
signification, but by pulling excess into the field of signification. This accepts the ontological 
stagnation of blackness—accepts the notion that blackness can be unified as a sign —and 
functions as an epistemological reaction that attempts to rearticulate how one knows blackness.  
The gaze of the Other represents the subjugation of visuality, subsuming even the 
affective resonance of voice, as that which brings blackness to life through artistic and aesthetic 
practice. This view of the relationship between blackness and visuality leaves an important 
question unexamined: from where does this life spring? This logic of visuality is structured upon 
a gaze that will ultimately lead back (again, for the first time) to conditions of failed mourning; 
the signification of blackness will be a return of the anticipation of an absence that never was. 
The reiterative cycle of signification is a perpetual movement from one moment of collapse to 
the next. However the life of blackness, the next section will argue, lies not in these moments of 
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collapse, but in the upshot of kinetic force produced through that implosion. Using theorists such 
as Fred Moten, and Kristeva, I suggest that black life lies in the gruesome sound of moving 
“from loss to loss, [until] nothing remains in me and my entire body falls beyond the limit— 
cadere, cadaver.”190  
Into the Uncanny Valley of Death: The Aesthetics of Descent  
This hauntological investigation has worked to outline how, through a series of 
phenomenal and psychoanalytic conjuring tricks, the ecologies of nonexistence have grafted the 
bodily and visual configuration(s) of blackness. As such, the black body is thrust into an intimate 
relationship with death. It is the goal of this section to explain how this deathly relation reveals 
the capacious life of blackness. Advancing the third chapter’s articulation of the relationship 
between abjection, aesthetics, and blackness through a consideration of afro-pessimistic and 
afro-optimistic theories of black life, this section attempts to address the question of origin left 
unanswered by the aforementioned theories of visuality. Using Ellison’s Invisible Man as a 
heuristic guide, I argue that the origin of the black body, conceived always in excess of itself, 
exists far beyond the regimes of visuality and ontology constructed to contain blackness within 
an undying cycle of signification. The balance of this chapter exposes how, through its 
relationship to abjection and death, the black body traverses the discords of signification, 
ultimately enabling a descent into and beyond the knowability of blackness.  
This section is foregrounded by the previous chapters’ discussion of the psychoanalytic 
conditions and phenomenal consequences that result from the overwhelming (pre)consciousness 
of negation and exclusion from the categories of humanity, which propagates the visual and 
aesthetic production and reproduction of blackness as an abject form. Hartman’s Scenes of 
Subjection offers myriad examples of the production and reproduction of blackness through 
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associations with an abject visuality. She highlights how bodies of black facticity were 
transfigured into abject commodities through the simultaneous “pleasure(s) of terror,” that 
pleasure derived from inducing mental, physical, and physic harm, and the “terror(s) of 
pleasure,” the horror inherent within scenes of forced enjoyment.191 As the former chapters 
illustrate, blackness emerged as an embrace of disappearance: a performative becoming that 
reached for the autonomy of one’s own subjecthood by using the performative and affective 
weight of blackness as a tactic of resistance and strategy of redemption. Considering the origin of 
the black body in light of this performative hauntology of death, we must ask: is it possible to 
disassociate blackness from its cyclical, performative, and visual signification of the body, and 
instead understand it through the kinetic, transformative energy it possesses by virtue of its 
production through the powerful stillness of affective collapse? An answer lies in articulating the 
aesthetics of descent through an investigation of the aesthetic theory of the Uncanny Valley. 
Such an investigation reveals how the affective moments of collapse can be mobilized to literally 
and imaginatively, that is to say phenomenally and psychically, push the subject pass the 
significations of death.  
The theoretical scaffold of the Uncanny Valley emerges from the work of roboticist 
Masahiro Mori, who in 1970, heavily indebted to Freud’s 1919 essay “The Uncanny,” published 
an article entitled “Bukimi No Tani” (translated to mean “valley of eeriness”) in the journal 
Energy. Mori originally hypothesized that nonhuman entity, operating on one of two registers, 
animation and motionlessness, would elicit an empathetic response from human observers as its 
appearance aesthetically approaches human-likeness. Using robots as nonhuman test “subjects,” 
Mori constructed a graphic representation of the human capacity for empathy in relation to its 
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nonhuman counterpart (see graph below), which revealed that aesthetic augmentations of the 
nonhuman actor’s human-likeness of would elicit a progressively positive emotional response. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This response steadily inclines until, however, that the aesthetic form of the nonhuman actor 
reached the point of the barely human. At this point on the graph, which Mori articulates as the 
point of the uncanny or the eerie, empathy quickly turns to loathing, fear, and/or revulsion. As 
the eerie similarities to the human form escalate in this nonhuman entity, the negative affective 
reaction of the human observer also grows in intensity causing the line graph to take a 
precipitous nosedive. The graph demonstrates the increase in negative affective charge, until the 
nonhuman actor’s empathetic response reaches the lowest point of the curvature—death. Another 
pivot of empathic response is reached, however, as the nonhuman agent ascends from the depths 
Graph 1: June 2012. “The Uncanny Valley” Robotics and Automation Magazine. 
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of the uncanny and begins to approach the ideal aesthetic form of humanity, the realm of the 
fully-human, or what Mori deemed the healthy human. Here, the nonhuman entity is recognized 
through “human-to-human” empathy levels. Demonstrating the full range of affective response 
elicited by the nonhuman actor, line graphs forms a deep valley. This simulated gorge, 
illustrating the fall and subsequent rise of negative affective response, comprises The Uncanny 
Valley.192   
Because of its situation as the phenotypical exception to the category human, blackness is 
constructed through its lack of aesthetic likeness to the ideal human form. As articulated in the 
second chapter, blackness is structured upon a politic of the sustained maintenance of difference, 
a politics that requires the affective register of blackness to be positioned at the point just before 
death. Articulated through the theory of The Uncanny Valley, Blackness, as the nearest 
nonhuman entity to the human form, has been firmly positioned at the lowest point on the 
curvature of elicited affective response; its aesthetic form signifies the dead. The aesthetic form 
of blackness, as a moving, breathing signification of death, operates on the highest affective 
register, as this project has worked to demonstrate, most recently through the poetics offered by 
Fanon. Theories of the Uncanny Valley allow a return to the question that emerges from the 
genealogical considerations of blackness raised by Hartman—is it possible to disassociate bodies 
from the visual signification of death inherent to the form of blackness?—with a vocabulary of 
aesthetics that articulates the possibility of the black body to traverse the curvature of empathetic 
response, simultaneously eliciting and mobilizing the movement of affect to operate beyond the 
registers of visual signification and, by that same token, objectification.  
It is this question of affectively produced aesthetic and visual mobility that, I argue, 
circulates within the seemingly dialectical theories of Afro-pessimists and Afro-optimists. The 
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Afro-pessimist response to the aforementioned question is breached in the work of Frank 
Wilderson. “When a group comprised of African-derived ‘people’—yes the scare quotes 
matter—gather at the intersection of performance and subjectivity,” Wilderson argues, “the 
result is often not a renewed commitment to practice or an explicit ensemble of questions, but 
rather a palpable structure of feeling, a shared sense that violence and captivity are the grammar 
and ghosts of our every gesture.”193 Wilderson offers a definition of blackness as constructed 
through the memory of slavery’s structure of violence and a need or cry to recover the 
surrendered autonomy of the black body. His work recognizes the construction of blackness 
through the corporeal knowledge of failed mourning. In line with Fanon, blackness functions as a 
deeply felt experience of negation that materializes in the phenomenal relationality between 
bodies of black facticity and the world. For Wilderson, black life is positioned at the aesthetic 
site of death and as such carries the affective charge, what he labels “palpable structure of 
feeling” that such a placement produces.   
I read Afro-pessimistic perspectives of black life through Kristeva’s articulation of the 
subject-making potential of abjection. Kristeva offers a nuanced articulation of the emotional 
emotional response elicited by abjection. “Food loathing,” Kristeva argues “is perhaps the most 
elementary and most archaic form of abjection…when the eyes see or the lips touch that skin on 
the surface of milk—harmless, thin as a sheet of cigarette paper, pitiful as a nail paring—I 
experience a gagging sensation and, still farther down, spasms in the stomach, the belly; and all 
the organs shrivel up the body, provoke tears and bile, increase heartbeat, cause forehead and 
hands to perspire.”194 This example speaks to abjection’s ability to, through the body’s 
phenomenal relation to the abject, literally push the body into motion—spitting, swearing, 
moaning, tensing, sweating, aching, vomiting—literally pushing the body into convulsion. 
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Kristeva provides another example that bears significance for understanding the relationship 
between blackness, death, and abjection: 
The corpse (or cadaver: cadere, to fall), that which has 
irremediably come a cropper, is cesspool, and death; it upsets even 
more violently the one who confronts it as fragile and fallacious 
chance. A wound with blood and pus, or the sickly, acrid smell of 
sweat, of decay, does not signify death. In the presence of signified 
death—a flat encephalograph, for instance—I would understand, 
react, or accept. No, as in true theater, without makeup or masks, 
refuse and corpses show me what I permanently thrust aside in 
order to live. These body fluids, this defilement, this shit are what 
life withstands, hardly and with difficulty, on the part of death. 
There, I am at the border of my condition as a living being. My 
body extricates itself, as being alive, from that border. Such wastes 
drop so that I might live, until, from loss to loss, nothing remains 
in me and my entire body falls beyond the limit—cadere, 
cadaver.195 
 
Here, Kristeva is demonstrating how the abject evokes not only corporeal movement, but also 
evokes the affective movement of thought that pushes the subject toward signification. In the 
case of the cadaver, the subject is moved to signify the borders of its own body through its 
encounter with the theater of death. This move toward signification is an act that must happen in 
order for the subject to live. Living then is an affective movement from one moment of abjection 
to the next—“from loss to loss”—until the inertia of being is abnegated, and the body is thrust, 
one final time, “beyond the limit” into the expanse of death.  
 The Afro-pessimistic aesthetic understanding of blackness as placed at the lowest point 
of the curvature allows for a mobilization of the kinetic energy of death through the act of 
re/membrance, as it emboldens bodies of black facticity to move toward signification. This act of 
re/membering, rather than discarding the abject, mobilizes an affect that ontologizes and 
localizes abjection within the black body. Unable to thrust aside that which inhibits life—the 
defilement(s) of the body that exceeds the signification of death—the black body is caught in a 
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cyclical movement from loss to loss without the ability to extricate itself from the point just 
before the limits of death. Yet in the interstice where the forces of being and abjection 
meaningfully converge, the conditions for living remain. Afro-pessimism seizes the productive 
life force of this space, and forwards it as the origin point of black life. Wilderson clarifies this 
point in a conversation with Hartman, “I’m not saying that in this space of negation, which is 
blackness, there is no life. We have tremendous life. But this life is not analogous to those 
touchstones of cohesion that hold civil society together. In fact, the trajectory of our life (within 
our terrain of civil death) is bound up in claiming—sometimes individually, sometimes 
collectively—the violence which Fanon writes about in Wretched of the Earth…”196 Wilderson’s 
work is a further illustration of the ways in which blackness is structured upon a performative 
hauntology of death, producing subjects through a corporeal relation in which the body “claims” 
of affective ecologies of imaginative and phenomenal nonexistence. Life is produced through 
this association with nonexistence as a result of the placement of blackness on death’s curvature; 
this is why the scare quotes matter. This is also why, as Wilderson explains later, “It doesn’t help 
us politically or psychologically to try to find ways in which how we live is analogous to how 
white positionality lives, because as I think [Scenes of Subjection] suggests, whites gain their 
coherence by knowing what they are not...”197 The black body, even through the affective 
resonance of its visuality, cannot reify its borders to know itself beyond its temporal emergence 
as abject; it will always be excluded from the parameters of humanity, as long as humanity 
carries the signification of whiteness. Black life, particularly in the United States, is therefore 
distinguished from the paradigms of its white counterpart, but nonetheless possesses the agential 
force of being.     
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An Afro-optimistic articulation of black life, contrarily, acknowledges the grammar and 
ghosts of blackness without endowing it with an agential influence over black life. Instead of 
ontologizing and localizing abjection within the body, this school of thought largely advocated 
by Fred Moten, mobilizes the affective movement inherent to the black body to escape its 
phenomenal signification. “Perhaps,” Moten suggests, “the dead are alive and escaping. Perhaps 
ontology is best understood as the imagination of this escape as a kind of social gathering; as 
undercommon plainsong and dance; as the fugitive word; auto-interruptive, auto-illuminative 
shade/s. Seen in this light, black(ness) is, in the dispossesive richness of its colors, beautiful.”198 
Afro-optimists call for a break in the affective stillness of blackness by provoking a move on the 
curvature. Such a move escapes the limits of death and progresses toward, what Mori’s graphic 
representation depicts as the “more than human,” perhaps the post-human. To unpack this dense 
understanding of blackness I, inhabiting Moten’s work, (re)turn to the body of the enslaved as 
the origin of blackness.  
Moten, following Hartman, agrees that the call to black subjectivity is bound to 
spectacular scenes of subjection and objection as demonstrated through the captivity of African 
bodies. Moten unfolds Hartman’s example drawn from the scene of Aunt Hester’s beating in 
Douglass’ autobiography. His witnessing of the violence enacted against his aunt was, for him, 
“an original generative act equivalent to the statement ‘I was born.’199 However, nestled within 
this recitation is an original repression, a sense of failed mourning, made evident by young 
Douglass’ urge to hide himself (“I was so terrified and horror-stricken at the sight, that I hid 
myself in a closet, and dared not venture out till long after the bloody transaction was over. I 
expected it would be my turn next”) as well as Douglass’ inability, years later, to articulate the 
full magnitude of the spectacle (“I wish I could commit to paper the feelings with which I beheld 
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it…”).200 This repression vanishes scenes of subjection even as they are invoked. Moten utilizes 
Hartman’s Scenes of Subjection, and her refusal to recite the spectacular scenes of subjection, to 
demonstrate how this subjection/repression/abjection is a spectral generational transferal to 
whose turn it is next. “[I]f every recitation is a repression” Moten posits, then “every 
reproduction of a performance is its disappearance.”201 As the maimed, marred, mutilated 
visuality of blackness falls from sight, the scenes of subjection fall with them. What remains, and 
what is spectrally transferred, is the phonic substance of those scenes, a substance that cannot be 
reduced to visuality, language, speech, scare quotes, or even a curvature. It is a para-phenomenal 
substance, what Moten calls an “inspirited materiality,” that constitutes the scenes and the 
subjects within them.202 
Moten sketches the constitutive force of this phonic materiality through a discussion of 
the enslaved as a speaking commodity. “My argument starts,” Moten explains, “with the 
historical reality of commodities who spoke—of laborers who were commodities before, as it 
were, the abstraction of labor power from their bodies and who continue to pass on this material 
heritage across the divided that separates slavery and ‘freedom.’”203 Through a sophisticated 
cruising of Derrida and Marx, Moten articulates how the nonexistence of the commodity 
produced an affective movement to signify the borders of the self. The resistance to, as opposed 
to the claiming of, these ecologies of nonexistence enabled an act of invagination, the embryonic 
process of being turned inside out, where “the commodity” turned inward to break from external 
value structures and produce an alternate, intrinsically derived sense of value. This internal, yet 
not intrinsic, value recognizes the confines of a pre-determined (white) humanity, and thus 
pushes pass the curve’s nodal point of “human to human” recognition. Said differently, if 
enslaved bodies are possessed by the object-oriented value of blackness, then this phonic 
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invagination is used to envision the body of the enslaved in light of this alternate sense of value. 
Thus a break is made between the putative abject exteriority and an intrinsically valuable 
interiority. The life of blackness, then, is constituted through the phonic surplus that resistance 
necessarily produces; Blackness, I argue, is fully articulated in the move—the escape—beyond 
the aesthetic, that is to say the visual and aural, limits of the human form.      
For this reason, black life is not contained within the phenomenal relationality of bodies 
of black facticity, because as both Fanon and Wilderson testify, the phenomenal orientation of 
the black body prevents the ability to enter the realm of the ontological. Black life must exist 
beyond this limit into, as Moten suggests, the realm of the aural which “breaks down the 
distinction between what is intrinsic and what is given by or of the outside; here what is given 
inside is that which is out-from-the-outside, a spirit manifest in its material expense of 
aspiration.”204 Moten, therefore, forwards black life as that which disrupts the movement of the 
spectral dimensions of repressed subjection and abjection, a life that exceeds the affective 
movement from loss to loss. In this place, “Where shriek turns speech turns song—remote from 
the impossible comfort of origin—lies the trace of our descent.”205 For Moten, black life is in the 
gutted silence of repressed abjection, which forces the subject to escape into its interiority until it 
falls beyond its own limits. For Moten, what is at stake is: “the universalization or socialization 
of the surplus, the generative force of a venerable phonic propulsion, the ontological and 
historical priority of resistance to power and objection to subjection, the old-new thing, the 
freedom drive that animates black performances…Part of the project this drive animates is the 
improvisation through the opposition of spirit and matter that is instantiated when the object, the 
commodity, sounds.”206 Following Moten, I argue that black life breaks the cycle of the kinetic 
charge of abject visuality and converts that energy into the unbounded, affective force of 
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plummeting pass the limits of signification, a force that is heard through a deathly 
nonexistence—cadaver: cadere, to fall. Ellison’s canonical text provides a garishly acute 
illustration of the improvisatory possibilities of black descent and ascension.    
   The Underworld of Blackness 
The prologue of Ellison’s text begins by illuminating his state of invisibility through 
story. “ One night I accidentally bumped into a man,” he begins “and perhaps because of the near 
darkness he saw me and called me an insulting name. I sprang at him, seized his coat lapels and 
demanded that he apologize.”207 The narrative continues to outline the vicious beating delivered 
upon the man’s refusal to apologize. Seconds before Ellison’s antihero moves to end the man’s 
life, he reaches the vital realization: “…it occurred to me that the man had not seen me, actually; 
that he, as far as he knew, was in the midst of a walking nightmare!”208 As the blade falls to his 
side, and the man moans on the cold concrete, the protagonist, unnerved that this man was 
“almost killed by a phantom,” fades into the darkness from which he appeared.209 As he vanishes 
from sight (again, for the first time), a final pivot in perspective occurs, as he realizes the 
absurdity of the man’s near-death experience caused by a figment of the man’s own imagination. 
In this realization he is overcome with absurd amusement, as he puts it, “I ran away into the 
dark, laughing so hard I feared I might rupture myself.”210 This final comment reveals the 
relationship Ellison’s text has to Fanon’s articulation of the phenomenal experience of blackness, 
a connection vividly drawn through Fanon’s final, and perhaps, most provocative reaction to the 
young child’s shriek. It reads, “Maman, look, a Negro; I’m scared, Scared! Scared! Now they 
were beginning to be scared of me.”211 In the aftermath of the child’s exclamation Fanon 
divulges, “I wanted to kill myself laughing, but laughter had become out of the question. I 
couldn’t take it any longer, for I already knew there were legends, stories, history, and especially 
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the historicity that Jaspers had taught me. As a result, the body schema, attacked in several 
places, collapsed, giving way to an epidermal racial schema.” (emphasis his)212  
These texts are united through the experiences of affective collapse and the anticipation 
of abjection that materializes as a symptom of failed mourning through the Other’s gaze. As 
such, both are placed within the limits of the uncanny. The anticipatory anxiety of blackness is 
further reflected in Fanon’s admission, “I cannot go to a ﬁlm without seeing myself. I wait for 
me. In the interval, just before the ﬁlm starts, I wait for me. The people in the theater are 
watching me, examining me, waiting for me. A Negro groom is going to appear. My heart makes 
my head swim.”213 In the moment preceding the film, and in the moment following the child’s 
utterance, both Fanon and the Other anticipate the apparition of the specter of death groomed to 
appear through the visuality of the black body. Overwhelmed in arrested anticipation, Fanon 
triples in time; he is at once his self, the haunted phenomenality of deathly ecologies of negation, 
and the haunting materialization of abjection. Fanon is subsumed into this collapse of time, so 
that out of his disappearance the presence specter of blackness can emerge. Fanon’s narrative 
verbalizes the unspeakable inability for escape, unable to actualize the performative possibilities 
represented through resonance of laughter.   
Ellison’s opening narrative, in similar fashion to Fanon’s, illuminates the tripling of 
novel’s protagonist, and the persistent conjuring trick of disappearance that characterizes his 
phenomenal experience. There is an important distinction, however, between Fanon’s and 
Ellison’s texts, which rests in the resonances of aurality. Though both articulate the experience of 
negation that, as this chapter’s epigraph recites, forces the self into an occupation of the space 
(and time) between nothingness and infinity, it is only Ellison’s protagonist who is able to avoid 
suffocating reification and escape into the hollow depths beyond visuality and ontology. Where 
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Fanon’s experience of this affective moment of collapse foreclosures his potentiality, his 
laughter is halted in the face of the thousands of legends and stories of his phenomenality, 
Ellison’s protagonist resonates with expansiveness. For Fanon, the surplus experienced by 
Ellison’s character is impeded.  
Ellison suggests that the absurd revelation provoked in the opening anecdote is 
paramount to understanding the self as possessed in a space of temporal disjointment. It is this 
revelation that ultimately structures the possibility of his ontological descent and subsequent 
ascendency. This affirmation serves as the conclusion of the prologue, as the protagonist argues  
that this haunted state absolves him of responsibility. He confesses, “I can hear you say, ‘What a 
horrible, irresponsible bastard!’ And you're right. I leap to agree with you. I am one of the most 
irresponsible beings that ever lived. Irresponsibility is part of my invisibility; any way you face 
it, it is a denial. But to whom can I be responsible, and why should I be, when you refuse to see 
me?... Responsibility rests upon recognition…”214 This manifesto reveals how invisibility 
absolves him of the responsibility of operating within the current(s) of time, what Derrida calls 
the  “monde,” as well as the current(s) of the visuality of simulated death. This is articulated in 
the protagonist’s return to his opening anecdote: “Responsibility rests upon recognition, and 
recognition is a form of agreement. Take the man whom I almost killed: Who was responsible 
for that near murder—I? I don't think so, and I refuse it. I won't buy it. You can't give it to me. 
He bumped me, he insulted me. Shouldn't he, for his own personal safety, have recognized my 
hysteria, my ‘danger potential?’ He, let us say, was lost in a dream world. But didn't he control 
that dream world— which, alas, is only too real!—and didn't he rule me out of it?”215 The tripled 
body lacks the burden of operating within the fluctuating significations of an imposed 
temporality. Occupying the space (and time) between nothingness and infinity, the body is traced 
!! 98 
with the affective force of spectrality, an irresponsibility that unchains the body from the “dream 
world (of the living dead)” constructed through the gaze of the Other.    
Fred Moten calls the force of this irresponsibility an “ontic-ontological fugitivity:” the 
unregulatable, para-ontological affective force of existence that operates not only in excess of the 
categories in which it is place, but also operates in excess of itself.216 In sharp contrast to Fanon, 
Moten explains and Ellison illustrates how the ontic-ontological force can be mobilized as a 
mode of resistance, moving from los to loss on the curvature of the uncanny until one ascends 
beyond the static parameters of humanity. “What Fanon’s pathontological refusal of blackness 
leaves unclaimed” Moten argues, “is an irremediable homelessness common to the colonized, the 
enslaved, and the enclosed. This is to say that what is claimed in the name of blackness is an 
undercommon disorder that has always been there, that is retrospectively and retroactively 
located there, that is embraced by the ones who stay there while leaving somewhere else.”217 The 
Invisible Man, through the phenomenal localization of the specter of blackness, exceeds the 
visual realm, and is thereby able to mobilize the ontic-ontological force of his body to move 
within and between the specter’s temporal collapse. Through this affective movement, he 
escapes within the aural and sonic resonance that operates on the fringes of the space/time that 
Mori’s theorizations graphically depict. This is demonstrated through his ability to hear the 
unheard chords of invisibility that orchestrate Armstrong’s poetry: “So under the spell of the 
reefer I discovered a new analytical way of listening to music. The unheard sounds came 
through, and each melodic line existed of itself, stood out clearly from all the rest, said its piece, 
and waited patiently for the other voices to speak. That night I found myself hearing not only in 
time, but in space as well. I not only entered the music but descended, like Dante, into its 
depths.”218 Though both Fanon’s and Ellison’s narrative articulate the experience of being tripled 
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through the same experience of affective collapse, it is the acknowledgement of corporeal 
surplus and the subsequent movement through the affective registers of stillness that ultimately 
allows Ellison’s protagonist to be coxed into a descent, what Moten refers to as the act of 
simultaneously staying there in order to leave somewhere. The ability to steal away precisely 
because of the inherent homelessness of a haunted constitution is, for Moten, that which 
ontologizes blackness through a fugitivty—a phenomenal and psychic escape into the resonant 
tombs buried far beneath ontology, where the “terribly beautiful vitality” of blackness can be 
accessed and mobilized upon one’s return to the realm of the living, a return that is for the first 
time.219  
Ellison’s psychic descent into the timbre of Armstrong’s sound, exposes the aural 
dimensions of that vitality through the gnostic sermon of a “blackness [that] is most black, 
brother, the Blackness of Blackness.”220 Though Ellison’s anti-hero returns from the underworld 
of affect and sound, his psychic self is trans-fixed, caught between the competing vibrations of 
the there of his body and the affective fixation on the somewhere of his consciousness and, even 
deeper, his soul. Moving from one moment of collapse to the next, the Invisible Man narrates the 
teleology of his ghosted constitution in hopes of exposing the expansiveness of invisibility, of 
blackness; the simultaneous infinity and nothingness that will ultimately “liberate the black man 
from himself,” as Fanon suggests.221 This sentiment is echoes in the crypts beneath New York 
City, where Ellison’s invisible protagonist is transported by the light of improvisatory escape, 
urging, “Without light I am not only invisible, but formless as well; and to be unaware of one's 
form is to live a death. I myself, after existing some twenty years, did not become alive until I 
discovered my invisibility.”222 
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Similar to Ellison’s protagonist, the concluding chapter of Specters and Spooks emerges 
from the depths of blackness to articulate how the black body, as the work of the specter of 
blackness, possesses a “certain power of transformation,” or, as Moten suggests, “an irreducibly 
improvisatory exteriority that can occasion something very much like sadness and something 
very much like devilish enjoyment.”223 As such, the final chapter begins to explore performances 
of blackness that exploit the knowledge of descent by performatively announcing into existence 
an affective collapse that continually pushes the body to resignify its borders beyond the purview 
of humanity. In pinpointing how bodies locates the affective and aural latitudes that emerge in 
moments of collapse, the chapter, in the words of Fred Moten, seeks to “fathom a social life that 
tends toward death, that enacts a kind of being-toward-death, and which, because of such 
tendency and enactment, maintains a terribly beautiful vitality.”224 
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CHAPTER 5: HAIMATJA: HOME  
 
And so it is not I who make a meaning for myself, but it is the meaning that was already there, 
pre-existing, waiting for me. 
 
Frantz Fanon, White Skin, Black Masks225 
 
Conclusion  
Centuries-old, yet saturated with post-modern renewal, this ghost story is recited from the 
timeless border between metaphysical presence and spectrality. Its narrative is formed in the 
mouth of spirits calling out from their tombs; there they wait for us. Their cry—haunting the 
horn of Louis Armstrong and echoing in the basement of invisible men, announcing the 
unspeakable truth of re/membrance, and irrupting the bodies of Till and Martin, the Jena Six and 
my own—travels far beyond the depths of their isolation inviting, compelling, a response. This 
project is infused with the enunciative force of that riposte. Specters and Spooks: Developing a 
Hauntology of the Black Body engages this choir of spooks and its post-modern sonata, 
“rumbling sound of ghosts chained to ghosts,” to reckon with the memorialized, inherited, and 
generational mourning of blackness: a politics that takes up the company of specters to 
understand how slavery constructed a “black hole” that bifurcated being into two categories: the 
nonexistent and everything remaining. Understanding the persistent seething affect of this 
reality, this hauntology has worked to articulate blackness not only as an experiential frame, but 
as that which conditions the phenomenal and psychoanalytic possibilities for subjects, regardless 
of their phenomenal orientation, positioned within the contemporary, racialized conjuncture in 
the United States.
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As such, blackness and all that this specter inhabits—bodies, myths and music, poetics 
and lyricism, voice, sound, speech, and love—is articulated through the full definitional offerings 
of an ontological quarry: 1) “obsolete: a heap of the game killed in a hunt,” 2) “one that is sought 
or pursued,” 3) “an open excavation usually for obtaining building stone, slate, or limestone,” 4) 
“a rich source:”226 Blackness is: 1) the collection of corpses performatively arranged and ordered, 
2) bodies sought after and pursued, 3) an evacuation of history that searches for the building 
blocks of immanence, and 4) a source that is both dense and rich in its nature. This hauntology 
unknots this ontological quarry to reveal how blackness saturates both space and time with a pre-
existing meaning of what it is to be (not only black, but) human. This layered meaning of 
humanity haunts the social configurations of post-modernity, forcing us to seriously consider the 
corporeal consequences of existing, in any relation to, a space void of existence. However, 
considering the presence of these specters and spooks revealed the radically productive power of 
the wailing void constructed through the negation of the slave’s humanity. Within the sound of 
haunting is the potential for descent that reveals a rich source of possibility. This final chapter 
evacuates the material formation of blackness, that is to say the black body, to find ways in 
which blackness is divorced from the bodies it intends to subsume. This hauntology, then, 
concludes by returning, again for the first time, to the body to ask how performative counter-
investments in the body enacted within the phenomenological and psychoanalytic, socioaesthetic 
and historical fixity can disrupt and reconfigure the deathly presence of blackness? What other 
modes of meaning making are at work through a politics that is performed alongside our ghosts? 
An answer lies in understanding how the underworld’s spirits are resurrected within a 
carnal form, as each of our bodies become the work of the spirit, we are the revenant of 
blackness. As Morrison’s Beloved delicately details, even though “anything dead coming back to 
life hurts,” within the act of resurrection resides the deepest pleasures of life.227 While, as 
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explained in Hartman’s work, pleasure is used to discredit claims of pain and erase black 
sentience, wrapped within those aesthetics of nonexistence is a deep sense of possibility—
“particular patterns of movement, zones of erotic investment, forms of expression, and notions of 
pleasure”—that can construct networks of affiliation, that is to say community, that reconfigures 
the death-driven sociality of the specter.228 How can we learn to live with the specters resurrected 
within the aesthetic scripts of the body to access the pleasure inherent to that resurrection? 
Derrida asserts that “One must have one’s ghost’s hide and to do that, one must have it. To have 
it, one must see it, situate it, identify it. One must possess it without letting oneself be possessed 
by it, without being possessed of it.”229 With that knowledge, the question becomes, how can we 
create spaces of pleasure, that is, spaces of aesthetic and performative reproductivity and insight 
by capitalizing upon the constitution of the black body through this performative hauntology of 
death?  
Such a politics of performance is articulated in Moten’s project, which seeks to “describe 
the material reproductivity of black performance and to claim for this reproductivity the status of 
an ontological condition.”230 The politics begins by exploring the relationship between resistance 
and blackness to demonstrate how the former operates as the catalytic force of blackness as it 
oscillates between autonomous subjectivity and a possessed objectivity, it begins by 
understanding that blackness, as Moten suggests, “is testament to the fact that objects can and do 
resist.”231 Moten’s reveals how the testimony of blackness, that is the performed resistance of 
objectivity, places blackness in-between a subjectivity that “is defined by the subject’s 
possession of itself and its objects” and an objectivity that is characterized “…by a dispossessive 
force objects exert such that the subject seems to be possessed—infused, deformed—by the 
object it possesses.” 232The power of the blackness to possess the subject, coupled with the 
subject’s ability to speak back marks the genesis of blackness; a genesis that subverts black 
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autonomy while simultaneously donning the black subject with an innate agency, or as Moten 
puts it an “irreducible sound,” that performs against its own objection. Using Hartman and Butler 
to elucidate his stance on black subjectivity Moten explains that “…the call to subjectivity is 
understood also as a call to subjection and subjugation and appeals for redress or protection to 
the state or to the structure or idea of citizenship—as well as modes of radical performativity or 
subversive impersonation—are always already embedded in the structure they would escape.”233 
This “irreducible sound,” this performative genesis of blackness inherent to scenes of objection 
becomes the movement by which the subject irrupts the haunting and reconfigures sociality 
induced by the specter of blackness.  
I explicitly engage performance, and in particular, theatre as a catalytic that instigates the 
irruption of haunting. My standing rendezvous with theatre is in accord with ways in which 
theatre scholar Harry Elam Jr. intellectually and artistically pursues theatre as a space of black 
cultural production, deepening understandings of the relationship between “the seen and unseen, 
between the visibly marked and unmarked, between the ‘real’ and the illusionary.”234 Theatrical 
productions deconstruct the relationship between historical narratives, visual discourse, and 
racial performance to unravel the regimes of race that frame contemporary understandings of the 
black body. At its core, is the belief that understanding performance in theory is necessarily 
incomplete without practice—the intimate and embodied knowledge of how one’s body, voice, 
and emotion work in concert to tap into an imaginative field that effectively creates new ways of 
embracing the world. This work began my using the Jena Six incident as a catalyst to articulate 
the legacy of lynching in the American South as a ritualistic practice that has tainted our 
understanding of contemporary, racial performance. I followed the writing and staging of “6 
Black Boys” with an adapted rendering of Ralph Ellison’s poetic narrative of racial erasure. 
Written in Fall of 2012, “Sketches of a Man” staged Ellison’s poetics of invisibility through a 
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theatrical re-telling of the process by which the black body becomes an alien unto its world and 
its self.  By juxtaposing Ellison’s novel to the post-racial political landscape spurred by the two-
time election of Barack Obama, the performance sought to articulate the ever-evolving dynamics 
of black visuality. Taking the performative excess of blackness as a starting point, I, along with a 
countless number of practitioners, use visual and performing arts to traversing the aesthetic limits 
of blackness in hopes to exceed the visuality of the black body. 
This has been demonstrated throughout the course of 20th and 21st American history, and 
through myriad art forms. I take seriously the words of theater critic and activist Larry Neal, 
who, in his 1968 manifesto, wrote “...theatre is potentially the most social of all of the arts. It is 
an integral part of the socializing process. It exists in direct relationship to the audience it claims 
to serve.”235 The liveness of theatre distinguishes it as an art form. Theatre offers a communal 
space in which two bodies, the performer’s and the viewer’s, collide to produce a mutually 
constitutive relationship that continues to exist beyond the theater space and compels the viewer 
to take seriously the artist’s critique of the existing material conditions as articulated through the 
bodies of the performers. Neal’s manifesto The Black Arts Movement, Amiri Baraka’s 1965 
essay “The Revolutionary Theatre,” as well as the seminal works by Jean Genet, Charles 
Gordone, Douglas Turner Ward and others testify to the political power and transformative 
potential theatre possesses.  
The Black Arts Movement, as the “spiritual sister” of the Black Power Movement, 
operated in and through the interstices of aesthetic production and political action to give shape 
to and define the borders of a community. Central to the Movement was the need to articulate 
“Black Experience” as the thread that ran through the collectivity of colored Americans who 
struggled to find themselves within the structure of being offered by the Western (white) world. 
What was located in this cultural and ontological exploration was, what has been termed, “The 
!! 106 
Black Aesthetic.” To elucidate the full force of “The Black Aesthetic,” Neal quotes Etheridge 
Knight: “Unless the Black artist establishes a ‘Black aesthetic’ he will have no future at all. To 
accept the white aesthetic is to accept and validate a society that will not allow him to live.”236  
Neal, by way of Knight, calls for art that creates new ways of being by propelling new values, 
new histories, and new forms of aesthetic expression in the world. The totality of this newness, 
the “new thing” of The Black Arts Movement while resting upon new ways of seeing blackness, 
is not exhausted in the visuality of art and life. The new vision of black is heard and felt in the 
opening riff of Charles Mingus’ baritone sax in Moanin’, and in hands and horns of the 
trailblazers of free jazz: Ornette Coleman, Cecil Taylor, Albert Ayler, and ultimately John 
Coltrane; it is imagined by Black Arts playwrights like LeRoi Jones, Ed Bullins, Jimmy Garrett, 
Jean Genet; it reverberates through audiences caught in the trance of “The Godfather,” and is 
voiced as they chant “I’m Black and I’m Proud;” it is poetized in the verses of Sonia Sanchez, 
Sun Ra, Larry Neal, Don L. Lee; and eventually spectacularized in films such as “Sweet 
Sweetback’s Baadasssss Song” and “Cotton Comes to Harlem.” Undoubtedly wrapped within 
the vision of this “new thing” are intimate connections to a deeply felt sensuality and aurality. 
While utilizing and relying upon drastically different cultural mediums—music, poetry, drama—
these artists seek to restructure the aesthetic form of blackness by traversing the discords of its 
aurality.237 The imagination of blackness as a body of possibility inspires, enlivens, and inhabits 
my work as an artistic scholar.   
Future Research Endeavors  
The future of Specters and Spooks seeks to expose the performative irruption of haunting 
through the deployment of performance theory and practice by extending chapters 2, 3, and 4 to 
analyze various performative counter-investments in the black body. I first aim to extend the 
genealogical considerations of the second chapter by tracing the specters of blackness beyond 
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chattel slavery in the United States to the 1804 independence of the island nation of Haiti. 
Exploring the thick history of the Haitian Revolution, I argue, solidifies the discussion of 
phenomenal and performative relationship between blackness and death by considering what 
Daphne Brooks calls the “transatlantic imaginary,” the spatially and temporally over-lapping 
diasporas of bodies caged within a trope of darkness. The social and performative manifestations 
of blackness, in the U.S. in particular, and intimate relation to death are inextricably bound to the 
transatlantic histories of revolution in Haiti. The recitation of this history begins on the night of 
August 22,1791, when slaves from nearly one-hundred plantations neighboring the city of le 
Cap, the former capital of the French colony of Saint-Domingue, gathered for a secret religious 
ceremony in the wooded highlands of the Morne Rouge, at a site known as Bois Caïman.238 At 
the ceremony’s helm was Boukman Dutty, who, through his role a coachman and commanduer 
at one of le Cap’s largest plantations, developed an intricate social and political infrastructure 
among black slaves and maroons throughout Hispanola’s northern region. 239 His authority was 
augmented considerably by the sheer magnitude of his soldier-like physique, and so more by his 
position as “Zamba,” a priestly position held by respected practitioners of the syncretic religion 
of West African Dahomean tradition and Christianity, widely known among French patriots as 
voodoo. Both his physical and religious gravitas proved crucial to what would become a 
legendary meeting of Saint-Domingue’s slave elite.  
On the night of August 22, with a stature large as the surrounding mountains, Boukman 
towered over the mass of blacks gathered at Bois Caïman to prophesize of the coming slave 
uprising. Over the escalating roar of an ensuing thunderstorm, the legend goes, Boukman 
professed, “Eh! Eh! Bomba! Heu! Heu! Canga, bafio té! Canga, mouné de lé! Canga, do ki la 
Canga, do ki la! Canga, li! (We swear to destroy the whites and all they possess! Let us die 
rather than fail to keep this vow!”240 Antonie Dalmas’ 1814 ethnographic representation recites, 
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following this a woman, taken by the spirits, started dancing in the crowd. “Armed with a long, 
pointed knife that she waved above her head,” Daniel Bellgarde’s 1953 Histoire Du People 
Haïtien recounts, “she performed a sinister dance singing an African song, which the others, face 
down against the ground, repeated as a chorus. A black pig was then dragged in front of her and 
she split it open with her knife.”241 Collecting the frothing blood in a wooden bowl, lifting it to 
her lips, allowing the warmth to coat her tongue, the high priestess confirmed her vow to 
Boukman. As each delegate made the same blood-oath, Boukman delivered an inspired call to 
arms that denounced the god of their French captors and sought vengeance against the god “who 
thirsts for our tears.”242 Igniting a revolution with his final words Boukman cried out, “Couté la 
liberté li pale nan coeur nous tous.”243 The folkloric interpretation of the events explains that it 
was this axiom—“Listen to the voice of liberty which speaks in the hearts of all of us”— that 
echoed through Morne Rouge as the insurgent force of nearly two-thousand split into factions to 
begin the immediate and systematically destruction-by-fire of all material manifestations of their 
existence under French enslavement: sugar mills, cane fields, farming equipment and tools, 
storage units, slave quarters, and above all else, planation dwellings.244  
Fighting under Boukman’s command, the brigade of slaves that gathered in the 
mountains of le Cap multiplied to just over twenty-thousand infantrymen in less than a month, 
burning nearly two-hundred of Saint-Domingue’s finest sugar plantations and over twelve-
hundred of the region’s coffee plantations in the process.245 By September’s end, Boukman’s 
company of slaves, free blacks, and maroons decimated every plantation within a 100-mile 
radius of le Cap.246 With crude military barracks set-up just beyond perimeter of the region’s 
capital, Boukman’s force was poised to sack the city, which functioned as the French’s only site 
of military resistance in the region, as well as a place of solace for the few whites who escaped 
the rebellion’s initial onslaught.  
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As the insurgent force continued to grow, mythologies of Boukman’s magico-religious 
voodoo methods propagated within the city’s walls. The first written accounts of Boukman’s 
uncanny siege of le Cap was recorded through a compilation of letters written by an order of 
nuns at the Communauté des Religieus Filles de Norte Dame du Cap-Français.247 “From the 
convent, the nuns saw the insurgents at the gates of le Cap, they heard their death cries, 
witnessed their dances; they felt the terror that had struck the soul of the whites upon hearing of 
the massacres and destruction that were carried out in the countryside.”248 This correspondence, 
juxtaposing the terror of the nuns to the near-fantastic barbarism of the rebel, speaks to French 
colonials’ presumptions of the rebel force as enhanced by a naturalistic “Stoicism” infused with a 
strong sense of beastly savagery, as evidenced by the unmitigated bloodshed of the revolution’s 
first month.  
The conviction that rebels were endowed with Stoic powers, a belief that rebels 
experienced their bodies as passive matter enhanced by a blend of naturalistic voodoo powers 
and a primordial fervor for violence, were furthered through the interactions between French 
troops and slave rebels. One French defender of le Cap recounts the story of a rebel captive who, 
after two failed attempts to assassinate his captors, admitted his conspiracy by stating, “Master, I 
know that is true. It is the Devil who gets inside this body of mine.”249 Even in the face of 
imminent execution, the narrator continues, the rebel jeered and mocked his captors, ultimately 
giving the signal for his own execution without fear or complaint. Baffled by the slave’s 
unyielding courage, the executioners examined the cadaver to reveal “…pamphlets printed in 
France [claiming] the Rights of Man…On his chest he had a little sack full of hair, herbs, bits of 
bone, which they call a fetish…and it was, no doubt, because of this amulet,” the French soldier 
reasoned, “that our man had the intrepidity which the philosophers call Stoicism.”250 The 
soldier’s conjecture, while within the realm of the fantastic, was not complete fantasy. Numerous 
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stories of revolutionary rebels have been uncovered that express a deep sense of personal and 
cosmic invulnerability not only through the scarified pig’s husks, which were kept for their 
presumed protective powers, but from the mythic certainty that death in battle would return one’s 
spirit to Africa.251 These beliefs, tied to the ritualistic practices of the Voudon religion, had a 
profound effect on the psyche of the slave rebels. The result was, what Haitian revolutionary 
scholar David Patrick Geggus illuminates as, a zeal toward death, an equal-and-opposite force of 
courageous ingenuity and suicidal fervor.252 This deathly zeal not only resulted in explicit 
displays of courage, as demonstrated by the aforementioned would-be rebel assassin, but 
functioned as the ideological force around which rebel forces were galvanized.  
In the eyes of the French, however, this zeal toward death, masked by a black savage 
spiritualism, was expressed through indescribable, supernatural feats of war.  Philibert François 
Rouxel de Blanchelande, governor of le Cap and commander of the French auxiliary troops in 
1791, expressed the impossibility of defending the city against the “regenerative” power of the 
rebel force. As the siege of le Cap extended from days to weeks, maroons and free people of 
color throughout the surrounding Morne Rouge mountain range joined the rebel force. This surge 
in numbers, when coupled with the assumed magico-religious spiritualism and guerrilla warfare 
tactics of the insurrectionaries, created an illusion of a force that “would not die.” As word of 
this defiance of death spread throughout the French force within le Cap’s walls, it was inflected 
with the Western European folkloric tradition of the revenant (or, in the Norse tradition, the 
aptrgangr), one who walks after death. French soldiers firmly believed they were in battle with 
the living dead. Le Cap ultimately fell to rebel forces on September 26, 1791, but not before 
surviving French loyalists fled to North America, taking with them the tales and legends of black 
magic and living-death. New York, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Charleston, SC, and Savannah, GA 
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bore the burden of the mass exodus from Saint-Domingue. No port, however, welcomed as many 
ships baring the French flag than the port of New Orleans.         
An understanding of blackness as animated by the specters of death benefits greatly from 
an investigation of the ways in which the historical events of the revolution on the island of 
Saint-Domingue have influenced the experimental ways that bodies embrace the relationship 
between blackness and death to resonant beyond the existing visual and ontological registers. 
This was demonstrated not only in the revolutionary zeal toward death embraced by Saint-
Domingue’s mutineers, but this embrace of death, maturing through a matrix of race, 
performance, and capitalism, continued to thrive in the Voudon inflected performances of the 
Congo Square in Louisiana, as well as New England’s phantasmagoria shows the 1840s and 
1850s. These phantasmagoria shows, where ethereal bodies of phantoms were conjured through 
the body of the performer, serve as another example of the body’s fungibility as the performer 
tip-toed the boundary of spirit and flesh by “mask[ing] and convert[ing] their bodies into 
instruments of deception,”253 These shows of racial phantasmagoria also conjured a deeply-felt 
American fear of the (racial) boundarylessness of the body; a fear most often played out on the 
body on slave mulattas. Within the show, the mulatta conjurer, often female, performs her body 
in a way that “call[s] into question the logic of enslaving people according to ‘blackness’… [as] 
the white mulatta’s body of evidence, her figure (encom)passing the uncanny traces of the 
familiar [white body of the spectator] and the foreign [blackness], makes the violence of his 
white supremacy spectacularly visible and yet disturbingly contiguous with blackness.”254  
Through this optic regime the spectator sees the “body of white power” etched on the 
body of the racial phantasmagoric mulatta, and thus the spectator comes dangerously close to 
recognizing the “traces of [his own] impurity.”255 This near recognition does two things: first, it 
acknowledges the power of the racially phantasmagoric body to conjure its own autonomy by 
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using the simultaneous legibility and illegibility of its body to create a space of possibility and 
resistant performance; and second, the body of the racial phantasmagoria illuminates the 
corporeal excess of the body, an excess desired to be harnessed and/or controlled through the 
gaze of the spectator. Again we become aware of the ways in which the body carries a “corporal 
surplus” rooted in the theatrically and revolutionary history of the “mythical black body.”256 The 
body eludes signification with an excess of meaning (spectacularly) “giving itself” in a way that 
overcomes its phenomenal form. Such performances, as Brooks highlights, and Moten affirms, 
forces a consideration of the ability of black bodies to use “gifts of performance to build a bridge 
out of abjection.”257  
Further the irruption of blackness through performative counter-investments in the body, 
I hope to, first: deepen my articulation of the aural registers of black visuality and the descent it 
provokes, as well as the psychoanalytic affective collapse produced through the relationship 
between abjection, the black body, and death. Second, I hope to use the aesthetic theory offered 
by The Uncanny Valley as a lens to explore the historicized haunting of the black body, 
particularly as performed in the Haitian Revolution and Vodoun influenced cultures of New 
Orleans, Charleston, and other locations through the American South and Northeast. Finally, this 
aesthetic lens provides valuable insight into the emergent scholarship on the relationship between 
the black body and the zombie, in both its Americanized and Afro-Caribbean traditions, the 
contemporary debate between Afro-Pessimists and Afro-Optimists, as well as popular 
manifestations of black (life and) death heard (seen and felt) in the musical/lyrical/poetic 
compositions and performances of Afro-futurists: Sun Ra, Octavia Butler, Parliament-
Funkadelic, and the rich anthology of artists exploring the boundaries between futuristic realism 
and science fiction that simultaneously deconstruct and (re)envision the past, present, and future 
of the African diaspora. Such investigations would also consider contemporary artists and 
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performance practitioners, such as Barbara Panther, Katori Hall, Kanye West, Janelle Monae, 
and Tarrell Alvin McCraney, whose work embodies the legacy of (re)defining the temporal 
structures of blackness by breaching its aesthetic and aural parameters.    
The final projected research endeavor seeks to investigate the counter-investments in the 
body as related to the conditions of failed mourning. Extending the third chapter’s theorization of 
blackness in/as failed mourning, I aim to read the presidency of Barack Obama through a 
hauntological lens to consider how his presidency explicitly demonstrates the intimate relation 
between the white body and the ecologies of nonexistence made present by the specter of 
blackness. Obama’s presidency may reveal yet another iteration of the conjuring trick performed 
by the specter of blackness, disappearing its origin by concealing the autonomy of phenomenally 
white bodies. The nationwide defamations arising in the wake of Obama’s election parallel the 
performative utterance of the young child—“Look A Negro!”—as the white body, in similar 
fashion to Fanon’s young travel companion, is drawn to the spectral borders of abjection and 
nonexistence by the specter of blackness. This affective moment of collapse forces a reification 
of the ecologies of white existence in relation to the ecologies of nonexistence that consumes 
Obama’s body. This psychoanalytic reimagining, however, is problematized by Obama’s 
genealogical configuration, which is explicitly separate from the sociohistorical lineage of 
American chattel slavery. Exposing the ways in which the conditions of failed mourning not only 
constitute blackness, but whiteness as well, Obama’s phenomenal presence, and the spectral 
weight his body carries, perhaps represents the call of death that softly echoes in the imaginaries 
of white America. Similar to my experience with the Jena Six, this call of death forces one to 
reckon with the possibilities of one’s own subjectivity as constituted through the imaginings of 
death. 
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 In the end, I believe the simultaneous elation and trepidation of Obama’s election 
necessitates a sincere consideration of the ability of the specter of blackness to conjure the 
hallucination of its own autonomy. Obama’s presidency refines the semantics of Audre Lorde’s 
well-known inquiry to ask: if the body is a tool of the master, can it be used to attempt to tear 
down the master’s house, even if the house has been made into a home that is now under the 
jurisdiction of the formerly enslaved? How can performances of blackness articulate black 
agency when spectacular conditions of suffering and pleasure, as represented through the 
simultaneous elation and fear of Obama’s body, have “so masterfully simulated black ‘will’ only 
in order to reanchor subordination?”258 Is his presidency another hallucination of the specter’s 
autonomy? Or does the presence of his body materially orchestrate a descent into the depths of 
blackness that aids in escaping the reifying cycle of signification?   
These questions elucidate why, for Derrida, a communion with specters is a question of 
justice. The act of mourning is in the pursuit of justice; it is a pursuit of the specters that bring 
into being the conditions of rectitude to which our bodies, as the work of the specter, are 
pledged. The irreducible trace of justice resonates through the body; justice, like its foil, 
haunting, will not befall one day because it must be worked at, our bodies must be worked over, 
haunted, inhabited from the inside to find the sense of justice that was always there, waiting. 
Explicating the dialogic relationship between the body in/as performance, haunting, and the 
ideals of justice Derrida writes,  
If he loves justice at least, the “scholar” of the future, the 
“intellectual” of tomorrow should learn it from the ghosts. He 
should learn to live by learning not how to make conversation with 
the ghost but how to talk with him, with her, how to let them speak 
or how to give them back speech, even if it is in oneself, in the 
other, in the other in oneself: they are always there, specters, even 
if they do not exist, even if they are no longer, even if they are not 
yet. They give us to rethink the “there” as soon as we open our 
mouths…Thou art a scholar; speak to it, Horatio.(emphasis his)259   
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I believe Derrida compels the mourner, the one who seeks justice, to find the resonance of the 
body that exceeds its phenomenal orientation and speak, which is to say perform, learn and live 
with the strength of that resonance. Not in an effort to “make conversation” with/about the 
specter (chapters 2 and 3 expose the dangers of such an encounter). Rather, we must fellowship 
within the quiet terror of injustice their presence brings to light. In communion with the specter 
we are granted with temporal and aural foresight, able to divulge the reluctant and unspeakable 
truth of our inaction as they, in turn, whisper the secrets of fugitivity. We must rethink the there 
of the specter’s haunting and descent into the irreducible somewhere of the specter’s aural 
presence, becoming a witness of the lines of flight the bend backward and forward from each 
moment of collapse—live fully and deeply from each loss to the next until, from the specter, we 
learn that the nature of haunting is the simultaneous ability “to be” and “to escape.” We must fall 
deep into the lull of the specter to, as Avery F. Gordon eloquently puts it, develop a 
“…willingness to follow ghost, neither to memorialize nor to slay, but to follow where they 
lead… to allow the ghost to help you imagine what was lost that never even existed, really. That 
is its utopian grace...”260 Perhaps, in the truest sense of the word, the haimatja, the haunting is a 
calling to bodies in search of a home. And by traversing each moment from “loss to loss,” living 
with those spirits, we realize that the “home” we seek never existed, really; thus illuminating the 
realm of possibility that was always there, waiting just beneath the surface, unseen. 
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EPILOGUE: DEEPER, ELLISON’S SONG 
 
to those who use their tongues 
as if they are more than flesh, as if 
inscribed beneath the muscle lurks 
an unrefined truth, to those who name 
to make the name a gun— 
the Zulu, the Seminole, the savage, 
Mulatto, Jew, Black, the Orient, 
the Alien, Woman 
the Other— 
those who name to know. 
imagine more than just 
fiber and liquids. 
different somehow 
is the scholar, the science steeped in doubt. 
Knowable 
Somehow. 
the historian. The philosopher. 
rest the tongue and 
take in hand the pencil that has traced your toes in 
“foreign” soil. Soles 
of feet, deep in the heart of the softest whisper. 
of you. forget 
the privilege presumed 
in the tongue and 
feel/listen 
re/member 
the warmth of the 
the deepest touch, 
distant though it may 
                     Be.
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